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ABSTRACT 
 Critical incidents that involve multiple responding Special Weapons and Tactics 
(SWAT) teams frequently result in interoperability, command-and-control, and 
familiarity challenges for all involved. Time and time again, after-action reports have 
shown that these challenge points are not easy to overcome, and this is a key problem 
because those with advanced knowledge of effective tactics in handling complex and 
rapidly changing incidents often contribute to these evaluations. Given the scale, scope, 
and complexity of modern mass-casualty or critical incidents, how do SWAT team 
structures dealing with interoperability, training, familiarity, and command and control 
need to change for SWAT response to remain viable? This thesis used the case study 
method of structured, focused comparison for two complex critical incidents involving 
SWAT units, drawing commonalities from among those incidents and juxtaposing them 
against a task force–based approach. These key commonalities were then discussed in 
depth, and several recommendations were made for strategic planners around the country 
to consider. The ultimate goal of this thesis was to provide a foundational guideline for 
homeland security leaders to change how SWAT teams are structured when responding 
to critical incidents from manmade threats in the United States. 
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The ever-changing world of critical incident response involving deadly threats 
continues to challenge law enforcement resources around the country. This is especially 
true when incidents involve attacks by suspects resulting in multiple major injuries and 
fatalities. The ability of law enforcement to respond quickly and effectively is often related 
to a region’s resource availability. Important elements to that resource cache—the ability 
to communicate seamlessly, the command and control of multiple groups of personnel and 
equipment, and the arrival on scene of advanced tacticians who are familiar with each other 
and understand roles and responsibilities—are paramount to the success of a region’s law 
enforcement response model. 
Teams composed of personnel with Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) 
expertise are some of the most important resources for these critical incidents. Time and 
time again, SWAT teams are counted on to handle complex, protracted critical incidents 
involving manmade threats that exceed the abilities of first responders. Sadly, recent 
history in the United States is full of such examples, and SWAT teams are commonly the 
last line of defense for law enforcement response to extreme violence and unique 
challenges created by attackers, who continually evolve their tactics and methods to 
befuddle the homeland security enterprise.1 
In responding to these incidents, leaders around the country have encountered a 
perplexing outcome. While these critical incidents often require flexibility and paradigm 
shifts of thought processes among SWAT leadership—skills that these teams are known to 
possess—similar or even identical challenges re-emerge in the after-action reports 
following the events. Reviews of many of the cases that involved SWAT response to mass 
casualty shootings or complex incidents show commonalities among suggested 
improvements for the next incident. Problems with interoperability, command and control, 
and required training and familiarity consistently appear as themes in these SWAT 
                                                 
1 Frank Straub, Jennifer Zeunik, and Ben Gorban, “Lessons Learned from the Police Response to the 
San Bernardino and Orlando Terrorist Attacks,” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 5 (May 2017): 1–7, https://ctc.usma.
edu/lessons-learned-from-the-police-response-to-the-san-bernardino-and-orlando-terrorist-attacks/. 
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incidents. If these issues have persisted for SWAT units and their parent agencies in many 
regions around the country, why are leaders not looking for new ways to address them? 
The goal of this thesis and associated research was to provide a viable alternative 
to homeland security leaders around the country to this query. More specifically, the author 
of this thesis sought to answer the following question: Given the scale, scope, and 
complexity of modern mass-casualty or critical incidents, how do SWAT team structures 
dealing with interoperability, training, familiarity, and command and control need to 
change for SWAT response to remain viable? The research involved a deep dive into the 
literature surrounding SWAT team formation and structure, as well as a decision-making 
model that the author argues is applied by many tactical teams today. The model, derived 
from the theory of open systems, is an organizational-based system of information 
processing that occurs in an open loop. This loop allows for information to flow from both 
internal and external origins, providing the decisionmaker with the ability to continually 
weigh whether a decision made by the organization had a positive or negative outcome. 
This outcome is then examined after the fact, and that information is applied for future, 
similar decisions by the organization.  
Additionally, two case studies were explored to reveal commonalities between 
teams in distinct critical incidents, as well as the common challenges seen in the 
aforementioned after-action reports of modern SWAT teams. More specifically, a 
structured, focused comparison of these cases was applied to extrapolate these common 
challenge points. To assist with the qualitative structure of this comparison, the challenge 
points discovered in this case study process were then grouped into three categories: 1) 
interoperability, 2) command and control, and 3) training and familiarity. While the 
incidents described in the case studies had other issues or challenges that could have been 
studied, the scope of this thesis was intentionally capped so that strategic planners could 
better focus on the discussion points mentioned. 
What emerged from this research process was a need to look at the practicality of 
standardizing specialized tactical units when dealing with manmade threats that result in 
critical incidents. Standardizing law enforcement for increased efficiency is not a new idea; 
indeed, literature arguing for organizational or governmental standardization both 
xvii 
regionally and nationally has been written and studied.2 While these studies have a nexus 
to what the author of this thesis hypothesizes is a prescriptive solution to SWAT teams’ 
critical incident response challenges, they do not focus adequately on tactical teams. This 
is an important distinction; while the standardization of any law enforcement process 
regionally or nationally would need to overcome several hurdles, SWAT teams are known 
for a culture that often struggles to interact seamlessly with outside entities. Thus, further 
research into the standardization of this highly specialized and skilled unit was warranted. 
Therefore, one prescriptive recommendation, as a result of this study, was to apply task 
force principles to a regional SWAT unit composed of local, state, and federal personnel 
and resources so that the aforementioned challenges have a logical pathway to be 
overcome. By combining these multijurisdictional assets into a standalone response entity, 
the byproduct of standardization for the unit’s equipment, training, and command structure 
is increased efficiency.  
This thesis explored similar examples of standardization for SWAT response as 
potential models. The Metro Law Enforcement Council (Metro-LEC) is a regional group 
of law enforcement agencies with combined personnel and resources to handle specialized 
calls, which would have stressed the resources of any single agency, including a SWAT 
team, in the given region.3 This thesis derived elements of the Metro-LEC’s model as 
background for its recommendations. Ultimately, the need to incorporate all levels of 
government, however, differentiates recommendations in this thesis from any other known 
model of SWAT response to manmade critical incidents. The author argues that federal 
participation is a needed part of this task force–based recommendation; as the history of 
task forces in law enforcement and the military has shown, interagency cooperation toward 
                                                 
2 Holly Campeau, “‘The Right Way, the Wrong Way, and the Blueville Way’: Standards and Cultural 
Match in the Police Organization,” Sociological Quarterly 59, no. 4 (2018): 603–626, https://doi.org/
10.1080/00380253.2018.1483782; I. C. Banks and R. M. Tackley, “A Standard Set of Terms for Critical 
Incident Recording?,” British Journal of Anaesthesia 73, no. 5 (November 1994): 708, https://doi.org/
10.1093/bja/73.5.703. 
3 Julie Schnobrich‐Davis and William Terrill, “Interagency Collaboration: An Administrative and 
Operational Assessment of the Metro‐LEC Approach,” Policing: An International Journal of Police 
Strategies & Management 33, no. 3 (2010): 506–30, https://doi.org/10.1108/13639511011066881. 
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a common mission works best when every regional stakeholder is engaged.4 This is true 
from a communication, combined subject-matter expertise, or fiscal responsibility 
standpoint. The author also submits that in deciding to create a task force–based SWAT 
team, homeland security partners must continually re-evaluate the efficacy of this unit and 
set clear parameters for when this unit should not be used.  
This thesis argues, however, that the likely efficiency benefits that would result 
from the formation of this type of unit outweigh the likely drawbacks, which is why the 
recommendations posed all center on a task force approach. Thus, the outcome of this 
thesis and associated research provides homeland security leadership around the country 
with alternative concepts for future SWAT team formation when planning for the mission 
of critical incident response involving active and deadly manmade threats.  
                                                 
4 Kip Schlegel and Edmund F. McGarrell, “An Examination of Arrest Practices in Regions Served by 
Multijurisdictional Drug Task Forces,” Crime & Delinquency 37, no. 3 (1991): 408–26, https://doi.org/10.
1177/0011128791037003007; Danforth Newcomb, Rachel Barnes, and Saamir Elshihabi, “US Tackles 
Money Laundering in Anti-Terror Push,” International Financial Law Review 20, no. 12 (2001): 40–42; 
Peter W. Phillips and Gregory P. Orvis, “Intergovernmental Relations and the Crime Task Force: A Case 
Study of the East Texas Violent Crime Task Force and Its Implications,” Police Quarterly 2, no. 4 (1999): 
438–61, https://doi.org/10.1177/109861119900200403; Jean-François Thony, “FATF Special 
Recommendations and UN Resolutions on the Financing of Terrorism,” Journal of Financial Crime 14, no. 
2 (2007): 150–69, https://doi.org/10.1108/13590790710742645; Richard H. Shultz, “U.S. Counterterrorism 
Operations during the Iraq War: A Case Study of Task Force 714,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 
10 (2017): 809–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1239990. 
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U.S. Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams face ever-changing 
interoperability, command-and-control, and resource-allocation challenges in today’s 
modern world. Asymmetrical warfare strikes, employed by foreign and domestic terrorists, 
have occurred in cities all across the United States. As Bobko et al. note, the San 
Bernardino terrorist attack of 2015 showed that “militarized terrorist tactics designed to 
inflict maximum damage to armored military units are now being employed by terrorists 
and purveyors of violence against unprotected civilian targets and domestic law 
enforcement agencies. . . . Complex, coordinated attacks appear to be the new norm, and 
they require rapid adaptation in response tactics.”1 The growing sophistication of terrorist 
attacks in modern-day American society is a disturbing trend. Improvised explosive 
devices, high-powered rifles, and armor-piercing ammunition are becoming more 
commonplace in these incidents.  
Such events could result in significant strain on first responders who do not 
typically train for the carnage or advanced tactics that were traditionally seen only on 
battlefields during wars.2 The complexity of such incidents demands greater preparation 
from America’s law enforcement SWAT units, which rarely have the resources to respond 
by themselves. This challenge has prompted many of the agencies in these incidents to call 
for SWAT mutual-aid agreements as the solution due to the demand of large-scale critical 
incidents on resources beyond one unit’s capabilities. A lack of interoperability, familiarity 
with other teams, and command and control, however, impede operations during these 
complex incidents. Historically, SWAT units from multiple jurisdictions have struggled to 
integrate seamlessly at critical incidents. SWAT team after-action reports following mixed 
jurisdictional SWAT team responses have repeatedly highlighted issues with 
                                                 
1 Joshua P. Bobko et al., “A Tactical Medicine After-Action Report of the San Bernardino Terrorist 
Incident,” Western Journal of Emergency Medicine 19, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.5811/westjem.
2017.10.31374. 
2 Bobko et al. 
2 
communication and interoperability, a lack of training familiarity and trust, and poor 
resource allocation.3 Each challenge is worthy of individual discussion. 
First, regardless of the updates in technology or communications infrastructure, 
SWAT units struggle with interoperability.4 Uncommon SWAT radio codes, differences 
in protocols and equipment, and variances in technological updates are examples of these 
struggles; research on interoperability problems among governmental entities are further 
proof that no single agency or governmental unit can solve this challenge.5 SWAT units 
require precise and timely communications paired with functional technology. In these 
rapidly evolving situations, radio traffic from a SWAT commander, or any other police 
entity for that matter, cannot be subject to misinterpretation, electronic interference, or 
delay. For example, the multiple sheriff’s offices, police departments, and emergency 
medical services that converged on the scene of the Columbine High School shooting in 
1999 could not communicate using their incompatible radio systems.6 Moreover, it is 
difficult to reach and maintain an agreed-upon level of technological performance across 
jurisdictional boundaries.7 Improvements to communications and interoperable 
technology alone have not solved the problem because federal, state, and local units 
frequently use different technological solutions than SWAT teams do.8 This “mixed bag” 
of technology only increases the chances of confusion during the critical incidents for 
SWAT teams while assisting first responders. 
Second, SWAT team members are often inadequately trained for all their possible 
missions. This deficit may be the result of, for example, the SWAT team’s duties being 
                                                 
3 Frank Straub, Jennifer Zeunik, and Ben Gorban, “Lessons Learned from the Police Response to the 
San Bernardino and Orlando Terrorist Attacks,” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 5 (May 2017): 1–7, https://ctc.usma.
edu/lessons-learned-from-the-police-response-to-the-san-bernardino-and-orlando-terrorist-attacks/. 
4 Bennet Bolton, “Lessons Learned: Planning for and Executing an Interoperable Communications 
Exercise,” Sheriff 59, no. 3 (2007): 15–19, ProQuest; Gerald Faulhaber, “Solving the Interoperability 
Problem: Are We on the Same Channel? An Essay on the Problems and Prospects for Public Safety 
Radio,” Federal Communications Law Journal 59, no. 3 (2007): 493–515.  
5 Faulhaber, “Solving the Interoperability Problem”; Bolton, “Lessons Learned.” 




seen as collateral, budgetary restrictions placed on personnel training, or the team’s 
inability to produce scenario-based training realistic enough to simulate particular 
missions. For multijurisdictional teams, this training conundrum is exacerbated by the need 
for additional training time above and beyond what each individual team requires for 
certification, which is hard to justify for many agencies. The reason is that the more 
complex critical incidents become, the more training SWAT teams need. Moreover, 
because many SWAT team members are collaterally assigned, their respective departments 
do not have the resources to send them to additional training with cross-jurisdictional 
teams.9 Multijurisdictional training helps to alleviate this concern, breeds familiarity 
between personnel, and most importantly, can add a layer of trust between all SWAT units 
in a given region.  
Third, resource allocation is a continual problem for many smaller SWAT units 
throughout the United States. SWAT mutual aid, which is used by many cities and counties, 
is a way to share resources that may be unique or in short supply during large critical 
incidents. This shortfall could be due to an incident of longer duration, or a specific need 
for a complex solution to a problem that only one agency in the area has. A single agency 
often struggles to muster the hybrid mix of personnel, technology, and unique subject-
matter expertise that mutual-aid protocols require. Moreover, a federal SWAT response, 
while a force multiplier, is not likely to arrive at a critical incident or mass casualty event 
without a long bureaucratic delay or a special circumstance.10 All of these challenges need 
further exploration to determine whether a better solution can be brought to bear. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given the scale, scope, and complexity of modern mass-casualty or critical 
incidents, how do SWAT team structures dealing with interoperability, training, 
                                                 
9 Karan R. Singh, “Treading the Thin Blue Line: Military Special-Operations Trained Police SWAT 
Teams and the Constitution,” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 9, no. 3 (2001): 673–717, 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol9/iss3/7. 
10 Oliver B. Revell, “Structure of Counterterrorism Planning and Operations in the United States,” 
Terrorism 14, no. 3 (1991): 135–44, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576109108435871. 
4 
familiarity, and command and control need to change for SWAT response to remain 
viable? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this review is to explore the research on the proper use of task forces 
in a law enforcement setting. The first section addresses the varying mission, structure, and 
application of task forces while the second discusses expert perspectives on interagency 
cooperation in task forces.  
1. Varying Mission, Structure, and Application 
Much of this body of work shows a continual theme of large crime group 
investigatory missions. An example of this was the task force formed to investigate Al 
Capone in the 1920s. Before 9/11, most task forces focused their investigative efforts on 
organized crime; after 9/11, the focus shifted to terrorism.11 According to Savasta as well 
as Baker and Fowler, the task force mission after 9/11 changed the primary mission to 
focus heavily on foreign crime that could lead to terrorism in America.12 They argue that 
the investigatory tools used to go after suspects under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act should be similarly applied to terrorist organizations.13 Thony and 
Newcomb, Barnes, and Elshihabi take it even further, as they assert that the focus of law 
enforcement task forces should be on the specific problem of terrorism financing and the 
ways to prevent the funding of the next big attack.14 Task forces have seen success in such 
crime interdiction in past decades, so the logic behind this tactic seems sound. Goodman, 
                                                 
11 Leveraging Mutual Aid for Effective Emergency Response: Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response of the Committee on Homeland Security, House 
of Representatives, 110th Cong., 1st sess. November 15, 2007, ProQuest. 
12 Michael Savasta, “The FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force: History, Integration, Success,” Law & 
Order 63, no. 9 (September 2015): 32–35; Brig Barker and Steve Fowler, “The FBI Joint Terrorism Task 
Force Officer,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 77, no. 11 (November 2008): 12–16. 
13 Barker and Fowler, “Joint Terrorism Task Force Officer”; Savasta, “The FBI Joint Terrorism Task 
Force.” 
14 Jean-François Thony, “FATF Special Recommendations and UN Resolutions on the Financing of 
Terrorism,” Journal of Financial Crime 14, no. 2 (2007): 150–69, https://doi.org/10.1108/
13590790710742645; Danforth Newcomb, Rachel Barnes, and Saamir Elshihabi, “US Tackles Money 
Laundering in Anti-Terror Push,” International Financial Law Review 20, no. 12 (2001): 40–42. 
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however, suggests that the best use of such collaborative units is to investigate the attackers 
directly while leveraging their information and knowledge of the organization to work back 
to the organization’s leadership.15 Literature documenting the discovery of Osama bin 
Laden via his courier system supports Goodman’s assertions.16 While practitioners and 
scholars support these focus areas and claim that many attacks have been averted with these 
approaches, it is unclear from the literature whether either approach directly correlates with 
an absence of similar attacks in the United States since 9/11.17 In fact, Mueller has argued 
that the increased focus on terrorism prevention from task force units has done little to 
prevent further attacks.18  
The topic of law enforcement task forces has gained the attention of scholars from 
a societal policing standpoint. Much as task forces in the previous decade were seen as 
potential terrorism prevention tools, many believe these units could be used to solve other 
unique and emerging crime trends in America. To this end, Helton and Carter see task 
forces as the solution to many of society’s ills. They suggest that multijurisdictional units 
can be used as force multipliers, even to the point that non–law enforcement personnel, 
such as medical professionals in the human trafficking context, can be included in the 
mission.19 They believe that societal crime trends in human trafficking and cyberspace 
cannot be effectively fought without the formation of task force groups singularly focused 
on these issues. Creek and Yoder, however, express concern over the use of task forces in 
questionable or heavy-handed roles that potentially overstep their boundaries. Their 
concern over past governmental entities’ abusing enhanced access to information or 
                                                 
15 Will Goodman, “Making Consequence Management Work: Applying the Lesson of the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force,” Homeland Security Affairs 4 (2008), ProQuest. 
16 Erik J. Dahl, “Finding Bin Laden: Lessons for a New American Way of Intelligence,” Political 
Science Quarterly 129, no. 2 (2014): 179–210, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12183. 
17 John E. Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016). 
18 Mueller and Stewart. 
19 James W. Carter, “Local Law Enforcement in the Realm of Cyberspace: The Role of Local Law 
Enforcement Agencies in Controlling Internet Crime” (PhD diss., University of Cincinnati, 2011), 
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/pg_10?0::NO:10:P10_ACCESSION_NUM:ucin1299008028; Megan Helton, 
“Human Trafficking: How a Joint Task Force between Health Care Providers and Law Enforcement Can 
Assist with Identifying Victims and Prosecuting Traffickers,” Health Matrix 26, no. 1 (2016): 433–73. 
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resources as a potential challenge that would counteract any benefits of these task forces.20 
The literature in both cases paints law enforcement task forces in “zero-sum” response 
roles regarding the mission’s definition. In other words, police task forces are either 
completely right or all wrong when used in these contexts.  
The diverse investigatory mission sets of task force enforcement have driven their 
time in service, as well as their overall design. Recently, a push for tactical mission focus 
by task forces has gained more attention. Frazzano and Snyder argue that current task 
force–like structures do not account for changes in current criminal activity, which is 
especially true with mass casualty attacks requiring a multijurisdictional response.21 They 
argue that the ferocity of these attacks demands that task force personnel be specifically 
trained and adequately equipped to respond immediately. In other words, they suggest that 
SWAT-level training be applied to multijurisdictional response groups as a standard for 
mass casualty active events.  
Task force structures and operations have been a source of contention for several 
years. Boetig and Mattocks discuss the need for task forces to take a strong look at their 
structure from a goal standpoint before building out the personnel who compose the unit. 
They contrast the examples of case-specific task forces whose goals are defined by shorter 
timeframes with specialized investigations that require training, experience, and resources 
to maintain momentum for an extended time.22 While this argument makes sense, other 
scholars suggest that general crime trends during the last several decades have not justified 
a big change to task force structures.23 Reppetto’s description of how crime was fought 
with task forces in the 1950s is not much different from the way groups were used to 
                                                 
20 Heather M. Creek and Stephen Yoder, “With a Little Help from Our Feds: Understanding State 
Immigration Enforcement Policy Adoption in American Federalism,” Policy Studies Journal 40, no. 4 
(2012): 674–97, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2012.00469.x. 
21 Tracy L. Frazzano and G. Matthew Snyder, “Hybrid Targeted Violence: Challenging Conventional 
‘Active Shooter’ Response Strategies,” Homeland Security Affairs 10 (2014), ProQuest. 
22 Brian Parsi Boetig and Mike Mattocks, “Selecting Personnel for Multi-Agency Task Forces,” Law & 
Order 55, no. 12 (December 2007): 51–54. 
23 Thomas Reppetto, The Blue Parade, vol. 2 of American Police, A History: 1945–2012 (New York: 
Enigma Books, 2012); Robert G. Kroeker, “The Pursuit of Illicit Proceeds: From Historical Origins to 
Modern Applications,” Journal of Money Laundering Control 17, no. 3 (2014): 269–80, https://doi.org/10.
1108/JMLC-01-2014-0005. 
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investigate terrorism in New York’s first Joint Terrorism Task Force in the 1990s. 
Moreover, Repetto argues, “The best way to handle a task force is not to form one after a 
crime has occurred but to have a permanent body in existence that takes charge in certain 
cases.”24 Nevertheless, the literature from this camp is dated and does not account for the 
more diverse mission sets that today’s law enforcement task forces face. 
More recent research supports a long-term unit structure. Kroeker points to task 
force investigatory groups as having long-term expertise for the specific crimes they are 
investigating, which have not changed dramatically over time.25 He specifically notes that 
task force groups that investigate terrorist financing, for example, should structure 
themselves to focus solely on investigating illicit financial gains of these organizations, 
with subject-matter experts working these cases long-term instead of moving on after a 
case has been adjudicated.26 Both short- and long-term structure models have value, but 
putting subject-matter experts in place for as long as possible to solve the goals established 
by task force leadership is a common theme among current literature.27 As previous 
mentioned, those who write about the structure of task force groups often discuss its 
connection to the group’s goals. This connection does not change when those goals are 
tactical in nature, rather than investigatory.  
The basis of any task force in law enforcement or the military includes “operations 
or operational planning involving two or more enforcement agencies that cross geographic 
or criminal justice system boundaries.”28 Schnobrich-Davis and Terrill argue that the 
modern model of law enforcement in America must be one that maximizes the resources 
of multiple agencies in fighting a more substantial and unified front against multiple types 
of crime. In studying the Metropolitan Law Enforcement Council—a conglomerate of 
                                                 
24 Reppetto, The Blue Parade. 
25 Kroeker, “The Pursuit of Illicit Proceeds.” 
26 Kroeker. 
27 Julie Schnobrich‐Davis and William Terrill, “Interagency Collaboration: An Administrative and 
Operational Assessment of the Metro‐LEC Approach,” Policing: An International Journal of Police 
Strategies & Management 33, no. 3 (2010): 506–30, https://doi.org/10.1108/13639511011066881. 
28 Schnobrich‐Davis and Terrill. 
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SWAT personnel in the Northeast comprising 42 different regional agencies cooperating 
under an “all-hazards” response capacity—Schnobrich-Davis and Terrill found that a 
regional model was successful in streamlined response. The Metro model is not alone in 
its regional task force–like structure. Makins describes an interagency network of 
personnel who can act as a force multiplier for smaller, water-based communities that lack 
a singular agency with the same resources.29 Makins has labeled this network the Special 
Maritime Action Response Team and discussed the crucial need for interagency 
cooperation among this group based on the governmental studies done by the Department 
of Homeland Security regarding maritime security gaps.30 Indeed, the overwhelming push 
for task force structures in much of the literature has been to combine resources in some 
capacity. 
The literature on task force structures in the armed forces reveals that they have 
similar goals to their law enforcement counterparts, as well as similar challenges. Bartone 
and Adler discuss the need for interagency cooperation among military tactical groups.31 
They state this specifically when describing the task force model in the armed forces: “The 
U.S. military is increasingly involved in operations that require specially configured task 
forces that are tailored to the demands of a particular operation.”32 Similarities to law 
enforcement’s task force mission and structure are evident here, especially the description 
of these groups’ structure during peacetime policing operations. Modern versions in both 
of these governmental arenas have adapted to the changing demands of their respective 
mission sets. In both, short-term task force groups, prevalent in previous decades, have 
been described by scholars as adapting to the changing environments they faced. 
McChrystal discusses this adaptation in the military context: “Driven by the necessity to 
keep pace with an agile enemy and a complex environment, we had become adaptable. . . 
                                                 
29 Marion C. Makins, “Revitalizing Maritime Security: Is SMART the Next Element?” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2019). 
30 Makins. 
31 Paul T. Bartone and Amy B. Adler, “Cohesion over Time in a Peacekeeping Medical Task Force,” 
Military Psychology 11, no. 1 (1999): 85–107, https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327876mp1101_5. 
32 Bartone and Adler. 
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. In doing so, we had a structure unlike any force the U.S. military had ever fielded.”33 
Adaptation to the changing demands of their environments were common themes in the 
literature for both law enforcement and military task forces. 
2. Interagency Cooperation 
The continual “pressure” task forces apply directly relate to how well these units 
mesh. According to Nagl and Burton, this use of task forces should include foreign military 
units co-deployed with U.S. fighters in a task force mode to establish a foothold for 
democracy after the battle is over, as it allows for a smoother transition.34 Switzer agrees, 
seeing this type of joint force as a positive in that American units have been able to 
transition primary fighting responsibilities back to the foreign countries’ soldiers in a semi-
controlled environment.35 Block disagrees, however, writing that units involving foreign 
and U.S. forces are fraught with complex challenges not worth the joint effort.36 She cites 
repeated incidents of insider attacks that have plagued foreign military task force 
involvement with U.S. military forces. 
The military has seen the benefits and drawbacks of interagency cooperation during 
wartime as well. Pope describes the use of an interagency task force to navigate many of 
the missions that the armed forces face. He has studied several past models, including 
counterinsurgency and humanitarian models, that had varying levels of success and failure. 
Ultimately, Pope argues that this task force model, as he proposes it, works due to each 
unit’s having a single leader with clear authority and direction for the group.37 Lamb has 
similar beliefs in the viability of interagency cooperation among military units from 
                                                 
33 Stanley A. McChrystal, Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New 
York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015). 
34 John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton, “Striking the Balance: The Way Forward in Iraq,” World Policy 
Journal 25, no. 4 (2008): 15–22. 
35 Cody Switzer, “Local Troops Support Iraqi Forces: Commander Says Area Unit’s Mission ‘Working 
Out Well,’” Erie Times-News, June 12, 2009, ProQuest. 
36 Melissa Block, “Fear and Mistrust Travels with Troops in Iraq,” National Public Radio, June 10, 
2005, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4698396. 
37 Robert S. Pope, “Interagency Task Forces the Right Tools for the Job,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 
5, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 113–52. 
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different disciplines.38 He takes it a step further than Pope, however, in that he bases the 
success or failure of these units, since 9/11, on the intelligence they are provided with 
before deployment.39 
Another body of work discusses problems that must be addressed for successful 
task force implementation. Schneider and Hurst discuss the problems that arise from 
interagency cooperative units, namely rivalries among the personnel assigned and 
statistics-driven missions that sometimes fog the real intent of the unit.40 These stress 
points, they argue, can affect trust in these units if leadership does not take clear and 
decisive action to prevent it early. Interestingly and predictably, both military and 
paramilitary (law enforcement) literature describes similar issues regarding the importance 
of leadership and interagency cooperation.41 Moreover, much of the literature portrays a 
strong leadership role in these groups as paramount. 
In addition to the aforementioned group dynamics, there are other challenges these 
groups need to overcome. For one, Schneider and Hurst argue that differing mandates 
create a gray area in decision making, which can slow the unit’s performance.42 While 
Schneider and Hurst stop short of dissuading agencies from creating and maintaining 
cooperative interagency groups, they do address several key issues that have historically 
caused friction with multijurisdictional personnel working together. Lamb, Schneider, and 
Hurst all discuss the themes of large delays in response during an operation or incident 
when multiple leadership approvals are needed to make a decision, the unwillingness to 
accept needed changes, and “elitism” or empire building.43 None of the sources offer 
                                                 
38 Christopher Lamb, “Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration,” Journal of Strategic Security 7, no. 
2 (Summer 2014): 8–20, http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.2.2. 
39 Lamb. 
40 Stephen Schneider and Christine Hurst, “Obstacles to an Integrated, Joint Forces Approach to 
Organized Crime Enforcement: A Canadian Case Study,” Policing 31, no. 3 (2008): 359–79, http://dx.doi.
org/10.1108/13639510810895759. 
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42 Schneider and Hurst, “Obstacles to an Integrated, Joint Forces Approach.” 
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simple solutions to these problems. Regarding the Metro model, Schnobrich-Davis and 
Terrill suggest one answer is requiring that all agencies involved defer to a standalone 
entity for decision making.44 Their description of this model suggests that independent 
decision making, separate from the groups directly involved in the process, streamlines 
delays. 
The challenges of evolving missions for task forces, the need to reconfigure 
structures to handle these missions, and the nexus of strong leadership to successful 
interagency cooperation are clear focuses throughout the literature. More directed research 
is needed, however, to explore how SWAT-specific task forces might function in these 
areas. Schnobrich-Davis and Terrill’s breakdown of the Metro model seems promising, but 
the friction from a multijurisdictional standpoint due to problems with interoperability, 
joint training, and command and control needs further analysis. In sum, there is a noticeable 
gap in describing how these units integrate outside of a purely investigatory role; 
specifically, research on tactical response, from an American law enforcement task force 
perspective, is lacking.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis explored the challenges of interoperability, familiarity, and command 
and control for SWAT teams during critical incidents using a combination of case study 
analysis and the structured, focused comparison method. Specifically, a clear, concise, and 
consistent set of commonalities and differences between both case study subjects was 
explored to find gaps that need addressing in future SWAT team structures. The case 
studies juxtaposed a large-team response and a mutual-aid team response; these are models 
that many cities and counties in America use.  
The structured, focused comparison method was used to qualitatively compare 
direct and indirect resource allocation for SWAT teams working under these two models 
because “aspects of each case . . . [were] believed to be relevant to the research objectives 
                                                 
44 Schnobrich‐Davis and Terrill, “Interagency Collaboration.” 
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and data requirements of the study.”45 The structured, focused comparison method is a 
variation of the case study method or process. By limiting the scope of research to the 
aforementioned categories in each case, this thesis could extrapolate commonalities from 
the cases that were continual challenge points for the SWAT units involved. In addition, 
these challenges were similar to ones still faced by SWAT units to this day, as explored in 
Chapter II.  
The purpose of using the structured, focused comparison variant of the case study 
method was to expose those focused commonalities that structurally appeared repeatedly 
in the documented incidents. These findings—focused on specific challenges—could 
better address the research question posed by this thesis. Quoting George and McKeown, 
Gläser and Laudel posit, “A comparison of two or more cases is ‘focused’ insofar as the 
researcher deals selectively with only those aspects of each case that are believed to be 
relevant to the research objectives and data requirements of the study.”46 These cases were 
meant to highlight critical incident response and resource allocation from a SWAT 
perspective, and not common uses of SWAT teams such as warrant service or special event 
overwatch or protection.  
The mutual-aid model relies on providing SWAT resources to regional law 
enforcement partners in the event of a specific need or incident. The first case study, the 
Christopher Dorner manhunt, discusses an incident that involved the use of mutual aid 
during a critical incident where SWAT responded. This incident spanned several 
jurisdictions and required the coordination of a large group of SWAT units working 
together to locate and capture Dorner. Specifically, the case focuses on how responding 
outside agency SWAT teams interacted with each other and the San Bernardino Sheriff’s 
Office SWAT team during the incident. This case was chosen because it highlights the 
                                                 
45 Jochen Gläser and Grit Laudel, “The Discovery of Causal Mechanisms: Extractive Qualitative 
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independence of the SWAT teams involved for normal operations while making 
themselves available for a large-scale critical incident in an assistance capacity.  
Large-team SWAT units are usually able to handle large-scale events without the 
assistance of outside SWAT resources. The second case study involves a large-team SWAT 
model. This 2009 incident involved the response of the Oakland Police Department’s 
SWAT unit when a shooter killed four sworn members of the department. This group was 
chosen because it is a large group of personnel responsible for a major metropolitan city, 
and the incident demonstrates of some of the identified SWAT team challenges. 
The data used to construct the case studies was a combination of scholarly and 
open-source research material on the subject of SWAT teams as it pertains to these cases, 
as well as literature relevant to organizational effectiveness. This included policies and 
procedures from the Oakland Police Department and San Bernardino SWAT teams and 
after-action reports from both incidents. It also included memoranda of understanding from 
other similar law enforcement groups. A “resource internode” diagram, or diagram of 
resource links between nodes, was developed to show how the same types of resources for 
the two case studies were directly or indirectly accessible. Specifically, the diagram helped 
to address each case study group’s access to SWAT resources based on its individual 
organizational design, structures, policies, and procedures. The research sources used to 
develop the resource internode diagram also came directly from the case study materials 
and other scholarly sources.  
In addition to using a structured, focused comparison variant of the case study 
model, the theory of open systems was briefly explored and discussed to better guide the 
reader through the decision-making processes among internal and external organizational 
stakeholders; in this thesis, the stakeholders are SWAT teams interacting with their 
environment from either an internal or external standpoint. Open systems theory, when 
applied to organizational situations, is a process of decision making that incorporates both 
14 
internal and, more importantly, external factors.47 These factors, or inputs, drive 
transformative thought and action, resulting in a changed output that is then tested when a 
similar incident occurs in the future. A continual feedback loop allows for the testing of 
processes for improvement, or deterioration, in a specific environment. This process is 
explored in Chapter II.  
The intended output of this thesis is a set of best practices and policy 
recommendations for both current and future SWAT team structures based on the case 
studies, as well as the consideration of a task force option. The goal is for policymakers to 
use these best practices and policy guidelines as a scholarly source when considering the 
long-term planning of their SWAT teams and the use of task force resources.  
The author of this thesis has made assertions at several points in the paper based on 
his training and experiences over 20 years as a law enforcement officer. This experience 
includes over a decade in SWAT-specific training, response, and networking in relation to 
tactical decision making. He acknowledges that these experiences have led to an inherent 
set of biases that shaped this project and study. It also provided a perspective of theoretical 
sensitivity toward the topic, which was used to expand on the literature sources used. 
Theoretical sensitivity, part of a research process called grounded theory, acknowledges 
the background and experiences of the researcher as an important part of the overall 
research conclusions made.48 While the combination of open and scholarly source 
literature, along with the author’s background, allowed for these assertions to be grounded 
in sound logic, it is important to be transparent in how some of the conclusions were drawn.  
                                                 
47 Patrick Y. K. Chau and Kar Yan Tam, “Factors Affecting the Adoption of Open Systems: An 
Exploratory Study,” MIS Quarterly 21, no. 1 (1997): 1–24, https://doi.org/10.2307/249740; Vincent 
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II. CURRENT MULTIJURISDICTIONAL SWAT TEAM 
CHALLENGES AND CONCEPTS 
With the help of technology and updated tactics, SWAT teams have evolved, but 
they still face challenges that are not easily solvable. Critical incident debriefs continually 
highlight weaknesses in interoperability, training, and command and control, which 
compel strategic leadership to re-evaluate SWAT protocols. This chapter examines those 
problems and explores open systems theory as a tool for decision makers in targeting the 
root causes.  
A. INTEROPERABILITY  
1. Communication Issues 
While it may not surprise most people that communication issues exist for police 
units in the 21st century, the fact that SWAT teams still deal with them should be troubling. 
These units are expected to respond to any tactical situation requiring advanced levels of 
expertise that patrol-level officers cannot handle. Additionally, when these units come from 
separate departments, such as multiple agency teams responding to a large-scale event, the 
communication challenges become much more significant.49 Regardless of the protocols 
put in place, a critical incident response—which requires specialized training in tactics, 
team movements, and detailed planning—can be put in peril rapidly when the SWAT 
responders are unable to communicate with one another.  
The history of SWAT response is full of after-action reports calling for tighter 
controls on interoperability among outside agencies.50 One of the reasons this tends to be 
a recurring problem is that SWAT units are fraternal in nature and prefer to rely on the 
tools, tactics, and techniques they are accustomed to using. In addition, there is no agreed-
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upon set of tenets nationally, which tends to result in a wide range of group abilities from 
region to region. Avdija mentions this when discussing the range of SWAT team training, 
equipment, and overall readiness: “There is no specific set of requirements that can be 
uniformly used by all police departments, especially for small departments.”51 The bottom 
line is that without a clear understanding of every SWAT unit’s communication, training, 
and nomenclature in a given area, it is unlikely these units can communicate effectively 
during a critical incident. 
While dated, the Columbine High School example shows what can happen when 
any police entity cannot talk on the radio at a critical incident due to nomenclature, 
unrelatable codes, or other inhibiting factors. This delay can raise doubt in response or, 
even worse, cause a “blue-on-blue” incident where a law enforcement officer mistakes 
another agency’s sworn staff member for a bad guy. SWAT teams are especially at risk for 
this problem because they are frequently dressed in clothing designed to mask their 
appearance while trying to approach a suspect quietly. In addition, they generally carry 
high-powered automatic rifles that can easily be mistaken for weapons employed by an 
active shooter at a chaotic scene. This has tragically happened multiple times during SWAT 
operations.52 
2. Standardized Technology Issues 
Early communication via trusted, standardized equipment and nomenclature is 
needed to help prevent these issues from developing. While there is evidence that 
technology used in a region by SWAT teams is often similar, communications issues arise 
when federal entities must access different bands or frequencies from local or state 
police.53 Seamless interaction among these types of SWAT teams—federal, state, and 
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local—in a critical incident is paramount. As these units often work without the benefit of 
time, they must be able to trust that back-and-forth communications are both acknowledged 
and understood. “Work arounds,” such as pairing units to “clear” a scene or lending 
equipment between teams, can serve as a last resort, but they often cause bigger issues 
among the teams when tactical decisions are made quickly. Ultimately, without a 
standardized equipment list for all SWAT teams—which seems very unlikely—this issue 
will continue to be a challenge when mixed jurisdictional SWAT units converge on scene.  
The Metropolitan Law Enforcement Council (Metro-LEC) on the East Coast is an 
example of multiple regional agencies, including SWAT team personnel, working together 
under a common communication framework:  
The third division of the Metro‐LEC is the Metro Regional 
Communications Division, which provides proactive planning and 
implementation services to aid the radio communications infrastructure 
across member agencies. It expands the inter‐operational abilities among 
member agencies and provides for tactical communication operations for a 
large‐scale incident. Additionally, the division has engaged in several 
projects to expand the radio network utilized in the event of a critical 
incident.54  
Unfortunately, such practices are uncommon in the United States, and even this example 
excludes regular federal interaction among SWAT teams. Thus, the interoperability 
challenge for SWAT teams goes beyond equipment and nomenclature. It necessitates a 
paradigm shift in team structure and continual operations at all jurisdictional levels.  
B. TRAINING 
1. Time and Cost of Scaled Training 
In addition to interoperability concerns, modern SWAT units are frequently 
challenged by the need to train continually for the variety of incidents to which they 
respond. Such requirements vary dramatically based on the areas of responsibility, but even 
smaller teams may be called on to assist in a large critical incident. The training needs to 
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maintain operational readiness can be significant—especially when factoring in specialty 
calls for service like hostage rescues and active shooters, the resource needs become vast.55 
The National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) provides guidance for SWAT 
teams around the country regarding training, capabilities, and other tactical-related 
metrics.56 The NTOA categorizes teams based on training hours completed and mission 
capabilities, advising that Tier 1 or Tier 2 teams—the highest levels of response—train 16 
to 40 hours per month on core SWAT skills, with additional time suggested for any 
specialty skills.57 SWAT teams with a smaller capability level are labeled “tactical 
response teams” and, thus, not addressed specifically in the NTOA’s training guidelines. 
The general suggestion for all of these teams, however, is to also attend 40 additional hours 
of team training annually.  
Based on the need for these groups to train regularly, these guidelines are 
reasonable. The reality, unfortunately, is that many SWAT teams are collateral duty–
structured. This structure means that the team’s members perform SWAT-related duties in 
addition to their normal assignments, which can range from patrol to investigations, to 
other administrative assignments. Training regularly to meet the NTOA’s guidelines is 
difficult at best, considering the numerous other demands in a law enforcement officer’s 
daily or weekly schedule.  
In the background is the need for these teams to work as seamlessly as possible 
with outside agency SWAT units. When a critical incident occurs, the expectation from the 
public is that a SWAT team, regardless of size, will handle the most complex of incidents. 
The resource demands of larger incidents, however, often dictate that multiple SWAT 
teams come together to handle the call.58 To do this effectively, these units need to train 
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together continually.59 When one considers the time demands for this training—layered 
on “normal” time needs for interdepartmental SWAT training—it is easy to see why these 
units might struggle to smoothly integrate at a critical incident.  
2. Structure of Continual and Standardized Training 
Currently, large-scale training for SWAT units typically comes in the form of 
regional exercises that involve multiple disciplines. Fire, emergency medical services 
(EMS), police, first responders, and others come together to respond to mock scenarios, 
many of which are based on real-life incidents. The SWAT portions of these exercises are 
usually designed by the training coordinator to be intensive and time-consuming (e.g., 
hostage situations, improvised explosive devices, and barricaded active shooters), so 
SWAT teams can work on advanced skills in a regional environment that forces 
collaboration with other teams.60 It is common for these types of large regional training 
exercises to occur once to several times a year, depending on the scale, resource allocation, 
and complexities of the training.  
While exercises are useful in creating networks for personnel to communicate with 
members of outside teams, it is difficult to build the necessary trust and muscle memory in 
the few hours dedicated to such training events. Additionally, these large-scale training 
sessions are expensive to administer for the groups involved, and supplemental funding for 
them is not always available. Thus, the usefulness of these types of training events is 
difficult to gauge. While this thesis is not recommending that training of this kind be 
stopped, arguably, the complex training that SWAT units need more regularly is not 
addressed during these exercises that attempt to simulate real-life scenarios.  
Standardized training for regional training exercises geared specifically toward 
SWAT teams is even harder to administer. For one, bringing multiple SWAT teams to one 
large location to train generally means that the areas these teams cover will not have the 
full resources available should a call for service occur at the same time. The result is that 
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these teams send several representatives to the training event to learn and bring back the 
information to the rest of their teammates. This option does allow for the sharing of current 
trends in the field of SWAT and provide networking opportunities, as previously 
mentioned. Unfortunately, it rarely allows for whole teams to work with other similar-sized 
SWAT elements from neighboring municipalities, yet large-scale SWAT training from a 
regional response perspective should be the primary goal of these types of training sessions. 
Without the ability to train entire SWAT units alongside their federal, state, and local 
partners’ entire teams, any pass-down from the training will inevitably pass through the 
filter of a specific SWAT operator’s—or smaller group of operators’—unique perspective. 
Again, this type of process makes future large-group integrations difficult to predict in 
terms of success. 
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
1. Jurisdiction and Culture: Who Is in Charge?  
SWAT teams, and law enforcement agencies more generally, still face the 
challenge of determining which agency’s team will take the lead during critical incidents. 
While resource sharing and willingness to help are often given without hesitation during 
the first few minutes of these types of situations, as the incident and resource needs become 
greater and as time passes, that willingness to defer may also change.  
SWAT teams operate in an “alpha mentality,” meaning that most teams want to 
lead from the front rather than play a supporting role. This is a result of their team members’ 
competing to get onto their respective teams, striving to be the best at what they do, and 
wanting to be positive role models for other SWAT units. These types of law enforcement 
personnel can struggle mentally and culturally with the idea that another team will come 
in and handle a call for them.61 This is not to say that SWAT team personnel are bad 
teammates; to the contrary, SWAT team members are generally selfless, and their success 
is built on the belief that the team succeeds or no one does. Being a good teammate, 
however, does not preclude the desire to be in charge of an incident. This thought process 
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is not exclusive to SWAT teams at a law enforcement call; frequently, the decision over 
who makes the final decisions can be contentious, and who is in charge can be equally 
challenging to a successful outcome of the incident. Such concerns arose in the after-action 
report of the Las Vegas high-rise shooting of 2017.62 It was also a concern during the San 
Bernardino shooting incident that heavily involved SWAT units.63  
Jurisdictionally, it is usually understood that when a crime can be prosecuted 
federally, that route of investigation is preferred. For locally or regionally based law 
enforcement agencies, that means at some point the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
will be involved. SWAT teams from the FBI are located across the United States, with a 
specially trained full-time FBI SWAT unit located on either coast to handle incidents that 
require specific training (e.g., advanced hostage rescue and major incident response).64 It 
is not uncommon for local teams to train with their local FBI SWAT team, as it is expected 
for these groups to interact frequently at incidents. This interaction is usually cordial, but 
as with the discussion of decision making from a whole-incident perspective, tactics that 
conflict between federal and local SWAT units can make joint response a problem.  
This is especially true if the FBI or another federal entity will be handling the 
follow-on investigation once the incident no longer requires SWAT resources. In these 
situations, the FBI SWAT unit—the federal tactical element of the incident—usually 
makes any and all strategic decisions involving tactical response. Local SWAT units could 
be used in a support role, and are a force-multiplier for the FBI. Conflicts may arise, 
however, when an FBI SWAT element attempts to direct an outside or local agency’s 
SWAT unit in a way that puts the local team at unnecessary risk. Deciding when and where 
that happens works only when the overall group’s leader is a known and trusted person. 
This is not always the case in critical incidents involving multijurisdictional SWAT teams. 
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2. Lack of Familiarity at Critical Incidents 
Critical incidents involving highly technical decision making (i.e., SWAT team 
involvement) make familiarity with and trust among regional partners all the more 
important.65 As highlighted in the training challenges discussion, trust is bred over time 
during multi-agency training sessions with regional SWAT partners with which each 
SWAT unit has established formal relationships.66 This outcome, of course, assumes that 
the training sessions are appropriately structured for trust to be established. The regional 
portion of such training is crucial; while local agencies can train with other local agencies 
and feel comfortable intermingling with their respective personnel, leaving out regional 
partners like the FBI undermines the goal of familiarity. 
Unsurprisingly, this is a common challenge at large-scale critical incidents. One 
reason could be that the responding SWAT units have not had a chance to establish formal 
relationships through training. Another could be that personnel have moved on to other 
positions in their respective agencies. Regardless of the specific cause of the unfamiliarity, 
it is unrealistic to expect the numerous SWAT teams to have regularly trained or been in 
contact with all of the other regional SWAT units before every possible critical incident. 
Therefore, a lack of familiarity may lead any or all SWAT teams involved in a critical 
incident to question the principal agency’s decisions. 
Of course, some leadership models mitigate this concern. Formal chains of 
command involving a unified command team structure, once established, are means for 
managing large-scale events appropriately.67 Such structures are in place nationally and 
regionally and serve as a “best practice” in establishing trust and efficient lines of 
communications and decision making.68 Incorporating SWAT teams into this framework 
is not a new concept, so on the surface, these types of “forced” relationships make a lot of 
                                                 
65 Leonard Johns and John P. Jarvis, “Leadership during Crisis Response: Challenges and Evolving 
Research,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, May 11, 2016, https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/
leadership-during-crisis-response-challenges-and-evolving-research. 
66 National Tactical Officers Association, Tactical Response and Operations Standard.  
67 H.R., Leveraging Mutual Aid. 
68 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2004). 
23 
logical sense. Unfortunately, SWAT teams, and law enforcement in general, can struggle 
with an environment where trust is a necessity due to the incident presented.69 Rather, trust 
established as an organic byproduct of familiarity is more likely to equal efficient, 
effective, uniform tactics and decision making. SWAT units that can pre-establish this 
familiarity usually need less oversight during a critical incident, which allows leadership 
to focus on bigger strategic problems during the response, rather than getting “into the 
weeds” from a tactical perspective.  
One of the worst things that can happen at a critical incident is for SWAT or any 
other law enforcement personnel to misunderstand or disagree on what their mission is, 
assuming it is based on proper moral and ethical grounds. This disagreement or 
misunderstanding can lead individual team members, or even entire teams, to modify or 
completely ignore orders or directions from leadership. The term mission creep is used to 
describe a group or team’s being deployed to accomplish a mission it is either not designed 
to handle or inadequately prepared to accomplish. Multiple examples highlight SWAT 
teams’ being inappropriately used, whether by design or by accident.70  
One example involving SWAT team deployment, as well as other police officer 
resources, was the manhunt for Christopher Dorner in 2013. Officers who either were 
confused or refused to follow mission orders put others at risk by creating their own 
missions. While this example did not directly involve SWAT units, the actions and 
motivations were similar:  
Once on the mountain there were numerous examples of individuals and 
small teams of officers conducting searches and activities without direction 
from the incident commander. There were incidents of officers deliberately 
working outside the scope of their mission so they could be the ones who 
captured Dorner. While these officers acknowledged they were working 
independently and outside of established mission guidelines and policies, 
the desire to capture the suspect appeared to outweigh training, policies, and 
common sense. What these officers failed to realize is they needlessly put 
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themselves and others in harm’s way and that made the event more 
complicated.71 
The last thing that any well-intentioned SWAT team or member wants to do is cause 
mission creep, but it can happen in rapidly evolving incidents. Familiarity with 
decisionmakers and why they are giving those orders, both from a ground-level and 
leadership perspective, can be a major factor in establishing trust while preventing such 
overstepping.  
This chapter has discussed some of the main challenges facing U.S. SWAT teams, 
regardless of region. Communication, training frequency, command and control, and 
familiarity are all common struggles when multiple SWAT teams converge on a critical 
incident and are forced to work together to accomplish a goal. These challenges exist in 
large part because of the advanced expectations placed on SWAT teams by themselves, the 
departments they work for, and society as a whole. Viewed as the “last line of defense” 
against complex attacks or prolonged law enforcement calls that require tactical response, 
SWAT teams cannot afford to be inefficient in their response capability.  
Access to resources, from a structure that allows for direct or indirect procurement, 
is explored later in this thesis. This discussion attempts to determine whether a change in 
SWAT team strategic structures needs to be realized to make SWAT units more effective 
in responding to critical incidents that affect large regions. SWAT team critical incident 
case studies in Chapters III and IV—involving a mutual-aid response (indirect access to 
resources) and a singular large-team response (direct resource use), respectively—shed 
light on this question. In addition, Chapter V explores a hybrid format that involves 
multijurisdictional team members brought together in a task force model as a potential 
solution to these challenges. 
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D. OPEN SYSTEMS  
A discussion of the open systems model is relevant in examining SWAT team 
challenges holistically. This model is not new but has been applied in different contexts to 
describe how things interact with each other, both externally and internally, from an 
organizational standpoint.72 The open systems model, for the purposes of this thesis, 
“suggests that an institution is subject to both internal and external factors in decision 
making.”73 The system is in a constant feedback loop, receiving inputs based on its 
interaction with the environment surrounding it and emitting outputs in response to inputs 
and environment. Thus, the system is “open,” as it is in a continual state of evaluation from 
those inputs and their interactions. This process is no different for governmental 
organizations when this theory is applied.74 Figure 1 illustrates the process. 
 
Figure 1. A Model for Open Systems Theory 
As previously mentioned, SWAT teams interact regionally, or externally, with each 
other in any critical incident requiring multiple resources to respond. How these teams 
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interact from an interoperability, command and control, or training and familiarity 
standpoint (inputs) while working during a large critical incident (environment) eventually 
leads to some version of performance or informational breakdown that results in a change 
in results (transformation) when applied. After an action has been taken and deemed 
successful or unsuccessful (output), this information is recorded and analyzed (feedback).  
This feedback can take the form of after-action reports (AARs), “hot washes,” 
incident debriefs, or another informational process. The changes made hopefully equal 
improved response to later critical incidents (inputs), and the process cycles again. As an 
example, a regional SWAT response to a critical incident may experience interoperability 
issues during the incident. After the incident concludes, recommendations to correct those 
issues appear in an AAR or incident brief, and those recommendations are ideally 
implemented by the teams involved before the next critical incident response. This cycle 
ideally occurs continuously until optimal interoperability performance is met. In the 
interoperability case, a regional SWAT open systems process might resemble Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. A SWAT Open Systems Theory Model 
The open systems model could be applied to study and improve regional SWAT 
team performance in an ideal world from a case-by-case standpoint but is likely applied 
consciously or unconsciously by many SWAT units. The repeated challenges found in the 
case studies of Chapters III and IV, however, demonstrate that AARs and critical incident 
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debriefs have yet to move the needle enough toward long-term improvements.75 Indeed, 
applying open systems modeling to these studies still results in numerous recurring themes. 
Regardless, this model provides a framework for a foundational understanding of the 
feedback and revisional decision-making process of many organizations. 
It is undoubtedly frustrating for homeland security practitioners and strategic 
managers to experience the phenomenon of addressing issues or challenges immediately, 
only to encounter them again in another region; evidence of this frustration is found in 
literature debating the effectiveness of AARs from a long-term perspective.76 While there 
is little doubt that the information in these AARs and briefings is useful, accurate, and 
informative, the challenges discussed in this thesis are not new or unique to the cases 
discussed.  
Table 1 summarizes this chapter and the main points of this thesis on SWAT 
challenges. A similar chart will help to summarize Chapters III and IV as well. 
Table 1. Chapter II Summary of Challenge Points for Modern SWAT Units 




1) Lack of common 
communication equipment 
and terminology 
1) Difficulty in scaled 
training for large group 
scenarios 
 
2) Continual and 
consistent training 
challenges on a larger 
scale 
1) Cultural and 
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III. CASE STUDY IN SWAT MUTUAL-AID RESPONSE 
This chapter presents the Christopher Dorner critical incident from primarily a 
SWAT perspective, while noting the repeated challenges discussed in this chapter. This 
chapter and the ones that follow put a sharper focus on these recurring difficulties—with 
the goal of informing the reader of their importance in future critical incidents involving 
multiple SWAT team response while providing context toward answering the original 
research question of this thesis.  
A. THE CHRISTOPHER DORNER INCIDENT  
1. Background  
Christopher Dorner, a former Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officer with 
a history of military combat training, went on a shooting rampage that terrorized and 
affected multiple jurisdictions in Southern California in 2013.77 Dorner had originally been 
with the LAPD for approximately three years (2005–2008), during which time he served 
in the U.S. Navy Reserve while being deployed overseas to Iraq.78 Dorner’s training and 
experience both with the military and LAPD gave him an arguably extensive background 
in firearms and shooting tactics. Dorner was ultimately terminated and left disenfranchised 
with the LAPD and several supervisors there, which ultimately led to him shooting and 
killing an LAPD captain’s daughter and her fiancée in Irvine, California, in 2013. 
After Dorner’s initial killing of these two victims, he began a crime spree that 
included, among other crimes, the attempted hijacking of a vessel, kidnapping, and 
additional shootings in San Diego County, the city of Corona, and Riverside, California. 
These crimes seemingly were in an effort to evade law enforcement after the initial killings 
in Irvine.79 Dorner went on to kill law enforcement officials in Riverside County while on 
the run, and ultimately fled to Big Bear, California, where he became involved in a shootout 
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with the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department (SBSO). The Big Bear shootings involved 
both the SBSO’s patrol staff and their SWAT team. This portion of the incident resulted in 
an SBSO deputy’s death as well. Dorner barricaded himself in a cabin in Big Bear during 
the final portions of this shootout, where he ultimately committed suicide with a self-
inflicted gunshot wound.80 Dorner challenged the scale, scope, and flexibility of law 
enforcement response during the several weeks this spree commenced, including having to 
deal with extreme winter conditions, as Figure 3 depicts. Dorner showed no empathy in 
committing multiple violent crimes against police and civilian personnel, and his advanced 
training in police tactics made countering his acts much harder for law enforcement, as 
officers had to think of multiple consequences for every decision they made. 
 
Figure 3. SWAT Personnel Returning to the Command Post during the 
Dorner Manhunt in Big Bear81 
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As mentioned earlier, this incident involved multiple jurisdictions and law 
enforcement agencies both investigating crimes committed by Dorner and responding to 
him tactically as he attacked them. Interestingly enough, mutual aid was never officially 
declared by the SBSO in Big Bear. However, the response to this critical incident mirrored 
a mutual-aid callout in many ways and, as such, was treated as a mutual-aid event involving 
SWAT.  
Once Dorner’s vehicle was located in Big Bear, burned and with tactical equipment 
left behind, it was clear that due to Dorner’s experience and knowledge base, a large-scale 
“manhunt” or search needed to occur quickly.82 Much of the tactical coordination of the 
search, and the eventual incident resolution plan, fell on the SBSO’s SWAT personnel due 
to Big Bear’s being squarely in their jurisdiction. As the SBSO’s SWAT team, called the 
Special Enforcement Detail (SED), had significant resources at its disposal from a 
department standpoint, it used mutual-aid protocols to handle the mission. Several reasons 
likely necessitated this choice: the immediacy of the problem, the remote area of the search, 
Dorner’s advanced combat experience and understanding of police tactics and protocols, 
and multiple law enforcement agencies’ involvement in the previous incidents outside Big 
Bear.83 
This incident did have its challenges, which from a complexity standpoint were not 
surprising. Hundreds of law enforcement personnel converged on Big Bear to assist. The 
AAR following the incident would highlight command and control and adequate 
allocations of resources as deficiencies in the response.84 SWAT personnel, acting in a de 
facto mutual-aid capacity along with the rest of the law enforcement staff on scene, realized 
success in certain aspects of this critical incident, while also experiencing several struggles 
with aspects of response.85 
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2. Successes and Challenges 
According to multiple accounts after the incident concluded, the bravery, 
dedication to selfless acts of teamwork, and initiative displayed by all personnel involved 
in the Dorner incident were evident.86 Early on in the discovery process of Dorner’s 
presence in Big Bear, SWAT team personnel made wise decisions based on sound tactical 
judgement. An example of this was relocating Dorner’s burned-out vehicle, with evidence 
in it, to another location in Big Bear due to the involved personnel’s exposure to potential 
ambush from Dorner.87 SWAT leadership communicated this need with critical incident 
leadership, and it was not questioned based on the totality of the circumstances. This action 
may seem like a minor thing but was an important decision based on the incident’s being 
close to local ski slopes that were crowded due to the Presidents’ Day holiday. 
Additionally, SWAT personnel from the SBSO worked with responding partner 
agencies to handle many of the minor calls for service in the area around the city of Big 
Bear so that the sheriff’s office could focus on the tactical response elements of the Dorner 
incident.88 This was ultimately a vital partnership and decision; as the critical incident 
effectively lasted close to a week in Big Bear, the SBSO’s SWAT personnel could not be 
re-deployed elsewhere or be tasked with collateral, non-related duties in the event that 
Dorner re-appeared. Dorner’s quick resurfacing is what ultimately occurred, and the 
SBSO’s SWAT team responded fairly quickly from a staged location in the city to assist 
with patrol deputies during the active shooter portions of the cabin scene.89 The actions 
there were praised by the experts who wrote the after-action report on the incident:  
When Dorner finally was discovered, deputies were successful in 
containing him from escaping out of the mountains. The final confrontation 
at the cabin was chaotic—and led to the tragic death of Deputy Jeremiah 
MacKay and serious injury to Deputy Alex Collins. However, the situation 
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was swiftly brought under control by the department’s Specialized 
Enforcement (SWAT) Division.90 
The challenges this incident revealed are important to note for several reasons. 
First, many of the critical incidents SWAT teams may face in the future will involve 
multiple agencies responding to assist. While potentially a force multiplier for even 
agencies as large as the SBSO, these resources can be just as perplexing if communication 
and control issues are not managed immediately.  
Second, SWAT units involved in a complex critical incident may be highly trained 
to deal with the threat but still struggle with understanding the importance of logistically 
managing the call. Interoperability and general communication challenges were recurrent 
themes for this event.91 Leadership, both on the team and in the department, must 
recognize and understand why SWAT teams do what they do, when they do it; a strategic 
leader in an agency, regardless of one’s individual SWAT expertise, might not have the 
luxury of deferring to a SWAT commander to make decisions that are outside the scope of 
one’s span of control.  
The Dorner incident included moments of potential blue-on-blue incidents for 
SWAT personnel on scene from multiple agencies that could have been avoided 
strategically. An example of this problem was apparent when the LAPD’s tactical units 
attempted to respond to Big Bear via helicopter without clear direction from the SBSO’s 
SWAT team, nor from anyone else in charge of the Big Bear incident for that matter.92 
This incident is covered in more detail in the command-and-control section of this chapter, 
but is an excellent example of just how complex the scene at the cabin was. 
While situations like the one described above are hard to avoid in complex 
incidents, such as the Dorner case, the reality of the extreme threat, at least from a 
communication and interoperability standpoint, should have slowed the response down 
somewhat from the LAPD. What underlay the Dorner case was the emotionality of the 
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situation. An LAPD captain had lost close family members to Dorner, and Dorner had also 
killed other law enforcement officers in his escape. To that end, every agency involved 
wanted to have a part in this case ending as safely and as quickly as possible. Regardless, 
the SBSO believed it had the situation under control, so any belief to the contrary by an 
outside agency should have sparked a formal mutual-aid discussion. Short of that 
discussion or request from the SBSO, any response into the “hot zone” might only put all 
of the agencies’ personnel on the ground in Big Bear in more danger.  
3. Interoperability, Command and Control, Training and Familiarity: 
Structured, Focused Comparison  
In examining the tactical response to this incident from a de facto mutual-aid 
perspective, the goal is to narrow the scope of retrospection to three elements: 
interoperability, command and control, and training and familiarity. This thesis attempts to 
answer this question using a “building block” comparison of these components. 
Specifically, how does a focused comparison of these elements hold up in searching for an 
answer to the main research question: Given the scale, scope, and complexity of modern 
mass-casualty or critical incidents, how do SWAT team structures dealing with 
interoperability, training, familiarity, and command and control need to change for SWAT 
response to remain viable?  
a. Interoperability 
The after-action report of the Dorner incident heavily critiques the interoperability 
issues for most of the law enforcement resources that responded to Dorner’s actions in Big 
Bear.93 The units that responded to the incident—as it crossed multiple jurisdictions—
neglected to share common radio frequencies, and modern-day technologies were not 
available for several of the involved agencies to communicate seamlessly over a police 
radio.94 Such technology involves the “patching” of radio frequencies into one common 
channel so that during a large-scale event like the Dorner case, all agencies within that 
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patched channel’s range can communicate without relaying from their respective dispatch 
hubs.95 This incident did not occur 30 years ago, nor did it involve agencies without 
budgeted access to this technology. In 2014, most if not all California-based law 
enforcement departments should have had this capability. Thus, it makes sense why the 
after-action committee found this detail so disturbing. 
Effective interoperability is not an optional tool in today’s world of critical incident 
response. This statement is especially true when one considers that many of the incidents 
are handled by just one law enforcement agency, regardless of whether that incident occurs 
in only one or across multiple jurisdictions. SWAT teams attached to any agency, 
regardless of size, are beholden to the same radio technology and interoperability 
limitations of that parent agency. In other words, the LAPD’s SWAT unit carried LAPD-
issued radios, the SBSO’s SWAT team carried SBSO-issued radios, and so on. While this 
makes sense from an interdepartmental communication standpoint, outer-agency 
interoperability was found to be a problem for field communication in the Dorner case. 
When given commands that were open to interpretation, the LAPD’s SWAT units 
responded via helicopter to the wrong location. In fact, they responded to a location that 
exposed them and other law enforcement SWAT operators to unnecessary danger.96 
Moreover, this issue was not limited to SWAT personnel on the mountain:  
The most significant and pervasive lack of radio interoperability occurred 
in the mountains above Big Bear during the hours before Dorner was finally 
cornered and stopped. . . . [I]t has been estimated that hundreds of self-
deployed law enforcement personnel converged on the remote mountain 
area during those final hours. Many of those personnel had no radio contact 
with San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department and sheriff’s officials had no 
way to communicate with them or coordinate their actions.97  
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The bottom line is that without the ability for all agencies involved to communicate in this 
incident, “it was a miracle that more officers were not injured in the resulting chaos of 
hundreds of independently operating personnel.”98 
The after-action committee suggested several ways to better prepare for a similar 
incident. One of these is the use of a liaison officer attached to a separate unit from another 
department to serve as a communication “go between” for both agencies. This suggestion 
has merit, assuming that the liaison officer has the appropriate trust and understanding of 
the unit to which he is attached. In comparing the interoperability challenges present in the 
Dorner case to the research question posed in this thesis, it is clear that interoperability 
among regional law enforcement partner agencies, especially among partner SWAT units, 
must evolve to a model that allows for common equipment. It is highly doubtful that a 
given region will agree on equipment standardization, however. Among many different 
standardization challenges, this could be due to a multitude of budgetary, cultural, and 
political roadblocks. Department leadership in every region needs to take a closer look at 
solutions that suggest more than one solution to the standardization challenge. These 
solutions are covered in more depth in the recommendations section of this chapter. 
b. Command and Control 
As with the interoperability gaps experienced during this incident, the need for a 
formal command-and-control structure that would follow state mutual-aid or National 
Incident Management System guidelines was not recognized by the departments working 
the active incident.99 Either system would have given leadership a better handle on 
resource management from a strategic level. Instead, there were several incident command 
posts (ICPs) established for the multiple scenes and areas in which Dorner was contacted. 
Even after the critical incident moved into Big Bear, there was no attempt by the SBSO to 
establish the protocols associated with mutual-aid response:  
The complications in maintaining command and control started to occur 
following the shootings in Corona and Riverside, and the discovery of the 
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burned truck in Big Bear Lake. . . . [T]he San Bernardino Sheriff’s 
Department opened an incident command post at Big Bear, in addition to a 
department operations center at the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department 
headquarters in San Bernardino.100 
Staging areas and logistics and planning stations, among other elements, would 
have been extremely useful in preventing the overwhelming response from self-
deployment, which stifled the ability of SWAT units from the SBSO to move up and 
around the mountain at once. Dorner was eventually found in Big Bear:  
When the pickup truck was discovered burning in the mountains on 
February 7th, law enforcement officers from throughout Southern 
California rushed to Big Bear Lake. Officers came by car and by helicopter. 
. . . There was no operational need for additional officers, and no request 
from the on-scene incident commander for mutual aid.101  
It appears that the SBSO and other assisting agencies did not realize that even though 
mutual aid was never officially declared or requested, all of the agencies involved with the 
response to Big Bear were acting as though it had been.  
This response dynamic was dangerous for many reasons, not the least of which was 
that the incident involved a subject who arguably possessed a skill level well beyond the 
average armed suspect. When dealing with an armed subject, the goal for SWAT and first 
responders is to isolate and contain the threat to the greatest extent possible to minimize 
the damage it might do. The SBSO’s SWAT team undoubtedly hoped for this exact 
scenario, preferably in a closed building or structure to shrink Dorner’s ability to evade 
capture again. For this to occur, law enforcement all over the mountain needed to 
coordinate efforts so that the moment Dorner was spotted, law enforcement could 
collectively isolate him. It could be argued that the speed with which this happened was 
only because the California Fish and Game officers, who had engaged Dorner in a gun 
battle, flagged down SBSO personnel and involved them directly.102 This allowed for 
fairly quick involvement of the SBSO’s SWAT unit to the cabin location, where Dorner 
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eventually died, as the SBSO’s patrol deputies were able to communicate with their own 
personnel without issue.  
Conversely, if a member of another agency had encountered the subject—without 
the ability to communicate Dorner’s continued presence in Big Bear, which at that point 
was an assumption based on the burned-out vehicle—Dorner might have continued to 
evade law enforcement given extended delays in notification. This again, is a command-
and-control issue as much as it is an interoperability issue. Any officer or deputy involved 
in the incident should have had the ability to communicate immediately their observations 
and actions to an on-scene ICP. This post, whether a unified ICP or a single agency version, 
could then have taken the necessary steps to broadcast Dorner’s direction of travel, 
description, and mode of transportation. 
As mentioned previously, the opposite occurred. Agencies that were involved in 
the incident at other earlier stages involved themselves more heavily without the SBSO’s 
knowledge. The LAPD’s tactical team was likely the worst example of this, as its 
penultimate involvement occurred during Dorner’s shootout with SBSO personnel from 
the cabin. The LAPD’s tactical unit flew into the area where the SBSO was engaging 
Dorner at the cabin, causing confusion and a diversion of resources to prevent a blue-on-
blue situation.103 
c. Training and Familiarity 
In terms of all agencies that responded to Big Bear once Dorner’s vehicle was 
located, training and familiarity with each other from both an overall department 
standpoint, as well as a tactical team perspective, would have been a key element. Even 
though he did not do an adequate job at masking his crimes, Dorner had already showed 
advanced skill in evading law enforcement.104 Once he was in Big Bear, Dorner showed 
he was willing to do anything to continue his evasion, including kidnapping innocent 
civilians and killing police. Beyond the suspect’s complexity, the area he was found in 
                                                 
103 Police Foundation, Police under Attack. 
104 Police Foundation. 
39 
carried extreme terrain and weather concerns. Thus, any response to help had to be well 
communicated and understood. There could be no confusion from any agency involved 
about what its specific role was. The Dorner case had good examples of this, such as the 
Irvine Police Department’s understanding of its responsibilities’ being investigatory 
only—and limited to the LAPD-related deaths.105 
However, how often the SBSO’s SWAT elements trained with the LAPD’s, or any 
other agency SWAT assets that responded, is unclear. In addition, as the Dorner search 
centered on Big Bear after his vehicle was located, SWAT operators from agencies all 
around the area descended on the city to assist as first responders and potentially SWAT 
elements if needed.106 All of these SWAT personnel in relatively small areas and with 
arguably little familiarity could have led to other blue-on-blue incidents such as the LAPD 
one described previously. These types of challenges are not easy to overcome once an 
incident of this magnitude is underway.  
In addition, while not explicitly detailing whether SWAT teams were willing to 
work together or not, the after-action committee noted that “throughout the events, agency 
assumptions about each other tended toward the negative. Examples include an assumption 
that only certain tactical teams possessed the high degree of skills necessary to capture 
Dorner.”107 This belief, or alleged belief, was grounded in a cultural dynamic that Chapter 
II explored: the mistrust of other SWAT teams that do not train together regularly and are 
unfamiliar with each other.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
There were several important takeaways from this case study in terms of future 
critical incidents of this magnitude. Given the scope and scale of the incident, the fact that 
it occurred over an almost two-week period, and that it spanned over hundreds of square 
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miles of jurisdiction, there can be no doubt that the Dorner case was the very definition of 
a complex critical incident. Any SWAT unit responding to a similar incident would have a 
multitude of emotional, political, and tactical challenges to overcome. The SBSO’s SWAT 
team did a phenomenal job overall in its management of the final cabin location where 
Dorner was killed, and there were several successes that could be taken from the case 
overall. Looking strategically at how the incident’s response could have been improved 
from a strategic level, however, is valuable. The following recommendations tie directly 
into Chapter V as well. 
1. Standardize Communications Equipment 
While standardization of communications equipment across all teams in a region is 
ideal, it is highly unlikely to happen. Communication equipment is specifically tuned for 
local, state, and federal needs, which makes it technically difficult to accomplish.108 
Moreover, individual departments have their own preferences in features and ergonomics. 
Additionally, cost considerations in the wholesale replacement of equipment are the types 
of budgetary decisions rarely made across an entire region simultaneously. In short, even 
if the perfect solution were available from a technological standpoint, several agencies in 
a given region would likely decline to switch to it for a host of reasons. 
Regardless, the ability to communicate is key for a successful critical incident 
outcome. It is arguably more important to understand what is being done rather than why 
it is being done; the why is in the hands of strategic decisionmakers who are in much 
smaller numbers at such an incident than the large group of SWAT operators 
accomplishing the what. The what can only be passed down effectively and quickly across 
large groups with effective communication techniques, which is why standardization of 
equipment for communication is such a highly valuable asset. Federal SWAT units are the 
biggest component in this challenge. It is uncommon for them to carry radios that can be 
patched with local agencies’ channels. While the after-action report in the Dorner case 
recommends a liaison being inserted into units from partner agencies to act as a 
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communication go-between, this goal could be accomplished via a structural change to the 
unit itself.109 Chapter V discusses how structuring a composite team from multiple 
jurisdictions accomplishes this feat. 
2. Position Command and Control with a Singular Multijurisdictional 
SWAT Response  
While there is no expectation that any critical incident will go completely as 
expected, the use of one, multijurisdictional response unit that is composed of members 
from every regional department would reduce the number of command-and-control issues. 
Some areas in the country utilize such a structure out of necessity due to resource 
scarcity.110 In the Dorner incident, the issue was the opposite: too many resources 
available, and too many agencies wanting to be included in the response. In either situation, 
a single unit comprising every regional department’s SWAT element would be an effective 
tool to mitigate mission creep, which was seen during the Dorner incident. Without the 
ability to streamline command and control over SWAT response, deadly mistakes can 
occur.  
If the SBSO, the LAPD, and other regional SWAT teams had already assembled a 
multijurisdictional unit for such an incident, the LAPD’s tactical blue-on-blue issue would 
have been much less likely, as direct control over any and all regional SWAT response 
would have been funneled through one small unified command group, if not one lead 
commander. This group would not have replaced each municipality’s unit but rather 
supplemented large-scale incidents such as the Dorner case. Chapter V discusses a way to 
share the responsibility of this type of unit. 
3. Require Continual Training and Familiarly for SWAT Units in a Given 
Region 
It is clear from the response to this incident that the SWAT teams involved rarely 
trained together. Communication and interoperability issues and confusion on mission 
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orders all were elements of the after-action report.111 While not a cure-all for the 
challenges faced, more frequent and involved training from a large-scale event standpoint 
would have likely cut down on the confusion.112 SWAT teams have a culture of trust that 
is hard to replicate without familiarity, and mutual training sessions allow teams to “feel 
each other out,” so to speak. This thesis acknowledges that this need is easy to say and hard 
to make happen, as the costs and coordination of regularly scheduled training among 
multiple teams are high. As Chapter II pointed out, when one factors in the calls-for-service 
demands of these teams—and the realization that they are rarely allowed to be inaccessible 
for emergency callouts—the possibility of holding these types of training scenarios 
regularly is small. To assist with this endeavor, a regulatory entity, such as the California 
Association of Tactical Officers or California’s Police Officer Standards and Training, 
could step in to set metrics for a given team or region to meet. While there are some general 
regulations already in place, specific goals relating to large regional SWAT training 
requirements would be preferable. 
Circling back to the previous recommendation, a multijurisdictional unit formed 
for these types of events could put together much more frequent training. The unit would 
be smaller yet still composed of all the departments that would respond. Hence, the 
capabilities, familiarity, and the cultural understanding of all the regional teams would still 
be known and understood. At a minimum, a unit structured in this fashion could reach out 
to another single departmental unit for assistance much more quickly due to the familiarity 
element alone. More importantly, training could be done on a smaller scale and still 
accomplish the goals that a response to an incident such as the Dorner case demands.  
4. Additional Observations 
While the Dorner case provided some unique challenges to law enforcement SWAT 
teams, the need for focused and detailed decision making is not limited solely to an event 
this large in scale. Table 2 summarizes the main challenges discussed in this chapter. 
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Table 2. Chapter III Summary of Challenge Points for SWAT Units 
during the Dorner Incident 
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IV. CASE STUDY IN SWAT LARGE-TEAM RESPONSE 
A critical incident can be centered in a small area of town or involve a large stand-
alone team from a metropolitan city, and yet be equally challenging. As the case study from 
the Oakland SWAT team illustrates, decisions made from political, emotional, and cultural 
standpoints can be just as challenging as those made from a tactical one. While the 2009 
killings of Oakland officers were clearly a tragedy, as were the killings of law enforcement 
by Dorner, some of the key elements of the incident need to be examined in further detail 
to determine a more efficient way of responding to a similar critical incident. 
A. OAKLAND’S 2009 SWAT SHOOTING INCIDENT 
1. Background  
On March 21, 2009, at approximately 1:00 p.m., an Oakland Police Department 
(OPD) motorcycle traffic sergeant made a vehicle stop for a minor traffic offense. Shortly 
thereafter, a second OPD traffic unit arrived on scene as a cover officer for the stop. After 
initially contacting the driver of the vehicle, the sergeant and his cover officer approached 
the driver a second time to inquire about his driver’s license, at which point the driver—
the sole occupant—began shooting at the officers. Both OPD units were initially hit twice 
each, but then the driver exited his vehicle and shot both of them in the back once at point-
blank range. Both OPD officers were mortally wounded. The driver fled the scene on foot 
and was last reported running southbound on an adjacent street, 74th Avenue.113 
After the initial shooting of the OPD traffic units, multiple officers from the OPD 
and other agencies began arriving en masse, as Figure 4 demonstrates, and an investigation 
began into both the shooting and the possible whereabouts of the shooter. Several higher-
level OPD supervisors were part of this response, which included personnel from the ranks 
of sergeant, lieutenant, captain, and deputy chief.114 OPD personnel attempted to glean 
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more information about where the shooter had fled. This information included details from 
multiple sources, such as eyewitnesses, who had purportedly seen the suspect enter a 
nearby apartment complex, and was corroborated by a confidential informant who knew 
the suspect and had called an off-duty OPD lieutenant to relay the suspect’s address.115 
Once supervisors felt they had enough information to reasonably believe they had 
the suspect’s address, they initiated a full SWAT team callout to respond to the scene. The 
on-scene investigation continued for approximately two hours, during which time 
leadership debated whether the suspect was indeed in the nearby apartment complex to 
which witnesses saw him flee. Eventually, several high-level supervisors on scene made a 
command decision to organize an ad hoc team comprising some SWAT members to check 
the address.116 According to the after-action report, this decision was made to rule out the 
address, as on-scene supervisors had deemed the information of the suspect’s whereabouts 
unreliable.117 
This was a key moment in the incident; a full SWAT team response had yet to 
arrive, and some of the usual incident command decisions—for example, establishing a 
formal ICP and delegating tactical decision-making responsibilities to subject-matter 
experts on scene, such as the SWAT commander—had not yet occurred. Regardless, the 
ad hoc team made a forced entry into the apartment and were immediately met by gunfire. 
The gunfire struck the first two entry team members, killing one of them instantly.118 
During the gun battle that ensued, a third SWAT entry team member was shot. He, too, 
succumbed to his injuries. The suspect was ultimately killed by other entry team members 
and a perimeter officer from a partner agency who had come to the scene to aid.119 
Amazingly, a female occupant of the apartment fled the apartment unharmed during the 
shootout.  







In the end, six people had been shot and five of them killed during the incident. The 
deaths included two SWAT team members, as well as the suspect. The suspect, a 27-year-
old male with a prior charge of assault with a deadly weapon, was wanted for violation of 
parole.120  
 
Figure 4. Law Enforcement Officers Taking Cover behind a Car during the 
OPD Shooting on March 21, 2009121 
2. Successes and Challenges 
While several parts of this incident could be dissected more fully, the OPD’s SWAT 
response is the primary focus of this chapter. Some non-SWAT actions are recounted here, 
however, because police usually experience certain precursors before invoking a tactical 
team callout. Indeed, this incident highlighted several decision points before the forced 
entry into the suspect’s apartment, which affected the probabilities of a SWAT team’s 
intervening without loss of life. Moreover, this thesis concedes that it is somewhat unfair 
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to critique the outcome of this event from an uninvolved perspective, and that there were 
personnel on scene who acted courageously under extreme stress. In retrospect, however, 
there were missed opportunities for better leadership, from a departmental and SWAT 
perspective, which might have affected the outcome. 
It will come as no surprise, but it is worth mentioning, that one of the greatest 
successes in this incident was the ability of entry team personnel to avoid shooting the 
female occupant of the apartment after taking heavy gunfire and losing personnel.122 The 
ability of SWAT entry personnel to correctly recognize the unarmed woman as someone 
other than the main suspect, while she ran past them to escape the chaos, was likely based 
on multiple sessions of advanced threat-recognition training.123 Given that these entry 
officers knew multiple OPD personnel had already been shot and likely killed, the added 
stress and, as Novy notes, likely tunnel vision would have only increased the chances of 
more bloodshed.124 Yet these officers could discriminate the woman running toward them 
as a non-threat and continue to press the suspect in a deeper portion of the apartment. This 
was the very definition of a successful decision.  
One of the other portions of this incident that worked well was the ability for 
personnel on scene to quickly accumulate several pieces of evidence while calling for a 
key tool in locating the suspect. From the use of independent witnesses and the confidential 
informant to the information found in the suspect’s vehicle that created an accurate picture 
of the threat, to the call for a human detection K9 unit, the OPD made sound, well-reasoned 
decisions.125 While the information gleaned from the several sources was not 
communicated to all OPD parties with a need to know, it should be deemed a success, as 
this effort was in the midst of a chaotic shooting scene, where multiple officers and citizens 
rendered first aid to the two downed traffic units and established a perimeter.126 
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As mentioned previously, the combined efforts of this initial investigation into the 
shooter’s identity and possible whereabouts led to the recognized need for a SWAT team 
response, and the decision for a team callout was correctly made. This chapter turns to a 
discussion about how that callout proved a challenge as it was unnecessarily delayed.127 
Without patrol first responders’ knowing the basic concepts of field investigations working 
in a prescribed order, however, the dire need for an advanced tactical response might not 
have been coherently understood in time for the SWAT team to make a difference.  
Arguably, many of the challenges faced during this incident, particularly from a 
SWAT response perspective, were intertwined with the emotions from the initial killing of 
two OPD traffic units. As separating the emotional and cultural elements of this critical 
incident would be a nearly impossible task, the discussion instead considers these elements 
as part of personnel challenges. Notably, while many other challenges in decision making 
and execution manifested at this critical incident, the following examples highlighted the 
need for improved focus on command and control, training and familiarity, and 
communications at SWAT critical incidents.  
While the decision to call out a SWAT team was a good one, the AAR discusses 
the incorrect way it was done and how it slowed the response by approximately 45 
minutes.128 Unfortunately, the series of incorrect decisions that led to the delay had a 
cascading effect on the incident’s ultimate outcome. If the OPD’s full-time SWAT unit had 
arrived earlier and prior to the dynamic entry, the decision to create an ad hoc team and 
“clear” the apartment would have likely been more deliberate. Such things as an attempt to 
pull more data on the apartment itself, for instance, the layout, number of rooms, and 
occupants; a strategy for inserting chemical agents into the apartment for proactive or 
reactive reasons; and a contingency plan for taking fire on approach or having an officer 
go down would have been standard operating procedures in the SWAT team’s planning 
decisions.129 As the AAR mentions, none of these measures were taken at the scene, and 
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the ad hoc team was rushed to enter the apartment to confirm the suspect was not there—
a grave and faulty assumption.130 
These rushed decisions were undoubtedly informed by emotions—stress and 
possibly anger—with the knowledge that OPD officers were dead, at the hands of a suspect 
who was still on the loose. Regardless, the need to rush into the apartment was not 
substantiated by any act by the suspect, and earlier arrival of the unit commander and the 
rest of the team would have likely brought this reality to light. 
The decision to enter the apartment with an ad hoc SWAT entry team was made for 
a bizarre reason. Instead of entering the apartment to capture the suspect—with a 
commitment by the group under the fair assumption it would face potential gunfire from 
the suspect—the scene leadership and SWAT officers involved decided to enter to confirm 
the suspect was not there.131 Yet the scene leadership, much of it composed of 
experienced, high-ranking officers, also argued there was no need to obtain a warrant as 
the entry fell under the “fresh pursuit” exemption of the Fourth Amendment against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.132  
These two options clearly conflicted: law enforcement either determines fresh 
pursuit of a suspect it has good reason to believe is in the apartment, or seeks a warrant to 
search the apartment as it does not believe the suspect is there but wants to enter and “seize” 
the home lawfully for investigative purposes. Given the premises of this thesis, the SWAT 
team’s decision to make entry was flawed, and units on scene that were SWAT trained 
should have recognized this dilemma and intervened. The AAR agrees: “The ad hoc Entry 
Team was composed of five SWAT Team leaders and three team members, who were 
highly trained and well experienced in the best practices of tactical procedures. As such, 
they [were] not exempt from raising policy, safety, and procedural flaws to a superior 
                                                 




officer.”133 Again, the high levels of stress and emotion from what had already occurred 
were likely symptoms of flawed decision making. 
Last, as the AAR mentions, the need for training and familiarity with team members 
is paramount to any SWAT-related critical incident.134 The ad hoc team had not trained 
together for such an extreme mission—albeit “extreme” in the lens of hindsight—and they 
believed at the time the entry was unlikely to result in a confrontation with the suspect. 
This type of entry would be difficult enough with a group that had much more familiarity 
with the individual tactics and team movements that each would be responsible for. 
Moreover, the entry team’s brief was “rushed” and not attended by every entry team 
member—the final ingredient in a recipe for disaster.135 Again, absent the need to hastily 
respond to active gun fire that would forgive some of these errors, previous training for 
dynamic entry should be left to those trained at the highest levels of SWAT response. 
Hostage rescue is an example of such a situation requiring dynamic entry under time 
pressures resembling the timelines of the OPD’s SWAT incident in 2009; the risks 
associated with such an entry are weighed against the risk of injury or death to the hostage, 
and making entry when certain threat cues are present is sometimes warranted, even if the 
outcome mirrors the OPD incident.136 The OPD’s personnel assigned to dynamic entry did 
not have this kind of training or familiarity with each other, which were contributing factors 
to the outcome once they had breached the door.137 
3. Interoperability, Command and Control, Training and Familiarity: 
Structured, Focused Comparison  
As with Chapter III’s case study, the goal of this section is to closely examine the 
elements of interoperability, command and control, and training and familiarity—using a 
“building block” approach—in this large-team SWAT response. The aim is to review the 
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incident with respect to these elements toward an answer to the main research question: 
Given the scale, scope, and complexity of modern mass-casualty or critical incidents, how 
do SWAT team structures dealing with interoperability, training, familiarity, and command 
and control need to change for SWAT response to remain viable?  
a. Interoperability 
For the most part, any known issues with interoperability during this incident were 
relatively minor. This would be the expected situation given that the incident primarily 
involved one law enforcement agency, the OPD. Members of the Alameda County 
Sheriff’s Office also responded to assist, and there were no reported issues with equipment 
interoperability between the agencies. To be fair, however, one of the main reasons that 
interoperability was not a significant issue in this incident was because many of the 
protocols that might cause interoperability problems were never established. Because no 
formal ICP-related protocols were ever established, and the command group at the incident 
allowed a completely uncoordinated response by close to 115 police units, the incident by 
default became easy to manage from an interoperability standpoint.138 Arguably, 
completely ignoring a key protocol in a critical incident response should not count as a 
positive.  
More specifically, SWAT interoperability was not an obstacle in the outcome of 
this incident because SWAT resources had a specific mission that did not require complex 
coordination with outside agency personnel. In addition, the OPD and the Alameda County 
Sheriff’s Office—the two agencies with personnel directly involved in the SWAT shooting 
portions of this incident—had been frequent participants in an interoperability exercise 
called Urban Shield.139 This type of exercise provided a testing ground for communication 
technologies between multiple Bay Area law enforcement agencies, so any issues with 
interagency communication were likely discovered and corrected before March 21, 2009.  
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b. Command and Control 
The greatest challenges during this incident resulted from deficient command and 
control. Because none of the command personnel or first-line supervisors followed any 
type of formal coordination plan, one of the worst resource-draining issues at a critical 
incident occurred: large-group self-assignment.140 Close to 115 units responded after the 
initial shooting of the two OPD traffic units, which should have necessitated a formal ICP, 
as well as a recognized incident commander. The failure to follow these protocols had a 
trickle-down effect on the eventual SWAT team callout and ad hoc deployment. Multiple 
OPD lieutenants on scene made decisions that either overrode or conflicted with their 
peers’ decisions. To this point, formal policies about when and how the OPD’s SWAT 
team should be called were not followed; more specifically, one lieutenant, later recognized 
as the de facto incident commander, directly violated these policies.141 The OPD’s main 
SWAT commander (sometimes referred to in the SWAT realm as the commanding officer) 
did not weigh in on the hasty formation of the entry team, the hasty entry plan formed, or 
any entry contingencies. Instead, the on-scene SWAT commander, who was the team’s 
executive officer, made these decisions with little experience to back them, something that 
the AAR strongly condemned.142 
As previously mentioned, the deaths of two OPD traffic units must have weighed 
heavily on leadership, as well as the responding officers involved. Police departments in 
general rarely experience this type of incident, and when it happens, emotions can run high. 
As Gibbs et al. note, the bonds between officers are strong, and officer-involved deaths are 
some of the worst incidents police face in their careers:  
Beginning early in their career, police are socialised into a unique culture: 
the police culture. One aspect of the police culture is loyalty to other 
officers. Understanding the risks involved with policing, officers rely on 
one another for reinforcement, especially during violent encounters with 
citizens. The longer one serves as a police officer, the more indoctrinated 
                                                 




into this culture he or she will become. In other words, longer tenure leads 
to more social investment as it strengthens bonds among officers.143  
Because of these emotions, it is hard to envision an incident like this unfolding with 
decisionmakers from the affected department effectively bifurcating their anger and 
sadness from the need to make sound tactical decisions. 
While not always feasible or practical, one way to avoid this challenge of emotions 
versus logic is to bring in another agency to assist. In this instance, the OPD might have 
avoided the loss of SWAT entry personnel if the entry decision had come from an agency 
or unit not directly tied to the original shooting and, therefore, not as emotionally invested. 
To be clear, this thesis is not arguing that another SWAT team could respond and altogether 
remove itself emotionality from the equation. Surely, any police agency involved would 
be intent on catching the suspect before he or she could cause further harm. Nevertheless, 
from a command-and-control standpoint, removing as many challenges as possible should 
be the goal of any supervisor or group of supervisors at a critical incident. An example of 
such sound tactical decision making occurred following the killing of Palm Springs officers 
during a call to a home in 2016, which turned into a SWAT standoff, whereby law 
enforcement leadership eventually deferred to the neighboring Riverside Sheriff’s SWAT 
unit even though Palm Springs SWAT units were available to respond.144 
Calling in a partner agency’s SWAT team, or having outside agency SWAT 
personnel involved in the tactical decision making, would have delayed the entry decision 
until absolutely necessary, and many of the AAR concerns over tactical decision making 
in the OPD incident would have been easier to defend.  
c. Training and Familiarity 
Large-department SWAT teams that employ the use of full-time operators, part-
time or collateral duty operators, or a combination thereof have the obvious need to train 
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continually with each other for any call they may face. In this instance, the AAR found that 
the operators involved in the entry of the suspect’s apartment had not adequately trained 
together for such a complex mission.145 Moreover, the ad hoc entry team members had not 
“trained or practiced as a team. They were SWAT Team leaders and had not worked as an 
integrated unit to perform effectively under stressful operating conditions.”146 This finding 
is concerning for many reasons. First, these operators all worked for the same department 
and, as such, should have had department requirements in place to ensure that every SWAT 
team member regularly trained together (it is possible this was in place and not followed 
by the individual officers). While outside agencies sometimes struggle logistically to create 
large training sessions incorporating multiple agencies, internal department training should 
be comparatively easier to accomplish and a must for this type of assignment.  
Second, as previously mentioned, dynamic entry without the benefit of surprise is 
one of the most complex missions for a SWAT team.147 Training scenarios involving all 
potential entry personnel repeatedly rehearsing for the vast multitude of reactions by a 
suspect in this type of entry should be implemented in all SWAT teams’ training plans. 
Without this as a foundation, the needed variables may not be weighed correctly before 
choosing to make such an entry, and the results could be catastrophic. If these involved 
officers and supervisors had continuously trained together for such an entry, they would 
have likely recognized the extremely hazardous nature of it and voiced those concerns.  
They might have also been able to predict potential reactions of the suspect and 
develop contingency plans for the challenges they faced once entry was made. Even with 
personnel who have been highly trained, there can be confusion brought on by the “fog of 
war” that affects split-second decision making.148 A thoroughly discussed contingency 
plan that is vetted prior to entry by all involved would result in entry personnel being less 
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likely to react inappropriately when confronted with deadly force. By all known accounts, 
this did not occur or was not properly recorded.  
Again, the desire to quickly capture the suspect who had just killed two OPD traffic 
units was likely a factor in overlooking the ad hoc SWAT entry team’s inexperience with 
each other in entry missions. Regardless, a group with this recommended prior experience, 
while still emotionally affected by the recent killings and the pressure to find the suspect, 
would have had a better chance of seeing the pitfalls of such a mission prior to it occurring. 
This knowledge alone would have lessened the likelihood of further carnage after entry 
was made and the suspect began shooting.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The OPD’s SWAT incident in March 2009 highlighted several gaps in critical 
incident response for the department, as well as its SWAT team. Admirably, the OPD did 
not hide from this incident but proactively sought reform through an independent review 
of it.149 The AAR laid out several key areas for improvement of the OPD. This section 
focuses specifically on some of the key SWAT team takeaways, which are similar in some 
respects to the AAR but which also include other important points of focus. As with 
Chapter III, the recommendations listed below tie directly into areas of consideration for 
homeland security leaders when structuring future SWAT teams. These recommendations 
are discussed further in Chapter V. 
 1. Establish Thresholds for Critical Incident Hand-Off
The sheer magnitude of this incident from a stress-management perspective was 
undoubtedly and understandably high. Any incident involving an execution of two partner 
officers, followed by a rapidly evolving pursuit of the suspect with conflicting information 
coming in, and ultimately resulting in the deaths of two more officers would be extremely 
difficult at best to calculate from an emotionality standpoint. Because of this reality, as 
well as the rapidly changing societal expectations from law enforcement, SWAT team 
response from the OPD perspective would likely be judged more harshly in similar future 
149 Stewart, Independent Board of Inquiry. 
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incidents that ended with a deceased suspect. The rush to enter the apartment, and then to 
advance through a hail of gunfire to ultimately shoot and kill the suspect, could be viewed 
as preplanned retribution for the initial and secondary killings of OPD personnel. In 
addition, the high emotions involved are hard to completely dismiss when attempting to 
logically plan any potential tactical mission. 
Deciding to use outside agency SWAT resources in a similar incident in the future 
would have several potential benefits. For one, the perception that a SWAT team was called 
in to essentially kill a suspect as revenge for the initial shooting of the agency’s officers 
would be greatly diminished. This outside unit would approach the problem like it would 
any other SWAT callout, and methodically look at every consequence without the lens of 
internal department bias or politics. Such was the case in the aforementioned Palm Springs 
incident. This unit would operate outside the political control of any affected department’s 
commander, and this alone would take some of the cultural pressure off the tactical 
commander on scene.  
Second, and arguably more important, an outside SWAT response would have 
likely brought with it a completely different set of personnel who were not affected 
personally by the initial killings of the OPD traffic units. Emotions would not be wholly 
eliminated from the equation, as no police officer or deputy could completely dismiss the 
loss of a sworn brother or sister. They would be greatly diminished, however, in 
comparison to a response involving a loss of one of the department’s own. Outside SWAT 
resources would have the ability to explain to on-scene command from the affected agency 
what is and is not possible from a tactical perspective at any specific time during the 
incident; such a dynamic would be less susceptible to contamination by the cultural fear in 
letting down a direct supervisor within the same department.  
Retroactively inserting this dynamic into the OPD’s SWAT incident may more 
shed light into why this is important. An outside agency’s SWAT team and tactical 
commander would not likely be afraid of retribution from the OPD’s command staff at the 
incident, as the command staff would not have the power to affect the outside SWAT 
team’s future directly. Conversely, the OPD’s SWAT resources on scene, serving in an ad 
hoc capacity, likely had to account for potential cultural or political reprisals if they 
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challenged the decision to enter the apartment as bad tactics. While this thesis does not 
suggest this type of internal strife existed during the OPD incident, it is not out of the realm 
of possibility. Outside SWAT resources would not have this direct problem.  
2. Standardize Training Requirements for Dynamic Entries and Hostage 
Rescues 
The AAR from the OPD’s SWAT incident specifically mentioned the inherent 
dangers in dynamic entry for the ad hoc SWAT unit involved in the March 2009 incident. 
One reason was that these units had not trained together for this mission prior to the 
incident.150 The high degree of difficulty for the type of entry these officers undertook has 
already been discussed by the OPD’s AAR and this thesis, and there is no need to restate 
it. Outside an active shooter–type response, the need to make such an entry should be 
assigned to a small group of SWAT operators who have been specially trained for it and 
are intimately familiar with each team member’s roles and responsibilities.  
The entry the OPD’s SWAT units made was very similar to hostage rescue in that 
it was dynamic and likely to induce a firefight if the suspect was in the apartment. Units 
specifically trained to handle hostage rescue during SWAT operations are often called on 
for these missions because of the potential for serious injury and death to the SWAT units 
involved and the victim hostage, and those with whom they are trying to intervene. 
Additionally, these missions are often timed with sniper assistance or chemical agent 
deployment, as well as crisis negotiators.151 In other words, they are not missions to be 
carried out hastily without a good chance of failure.  
Having specialized entry units that have trained together for these types of entries and 
are familiar with each other and the mission is a big takeaway from the OPD’s incident. If such 
a unit had been called in and understood from the top-down by OPD personnel as required for 
this type of call, the ad hoc team formation would not have occurred. This type of unit might 
have existed among the SWAT team still en route to the call; even so, the on-scene commander 
and the newly made tactical commander disregarded any reason to wait for such a unit to arrive. 
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The decision to force entry may have been different if the command staff on scene truly 
believed as a group that the suspect was inside the apartment. The bottom line is that without 
a group to respond to the scene that has previous training and familiarity with such a complex 
and difficult mission, the results may be the same or worse.  
3. Involve Regional Partners in Large-Scale Critical Incidents 
The OPD’s leadership had varying levels of certainty that the suspect was still on 
scene, or at least nearby, throughout the incident.152 Therefore, the decision to first call 
out a full OPD SWAT response, but then disregard it for a forced entry mission, was based 
on faulty logic and improper information flow. Without a formalized command-and-
control structure, the large number of units were managed ineffectively, which of course 
included the SWAT response and mission. As it turned out, the suspect was in his 
apartment, and the incident was ultimately contained to several city blocks. The potential 
for the incident to have been much more significant, however, should not be discounted 
just because it was indeed confined geographically to a small area. If it was possible that 
the suspect had traveled outside the perimeter, a larger search area should have been 
considered. 
Theoretically, a larger perimeter would have promoted clarity in this incident, and 
regional assistance would have had a trickle-down effect on the units responding, including 
SWAT. Some of the other recommended elements of the response that needed to be 
addressed—including specialized training and critical incident thresholds for hand-off—
would arguably have been easier to manage, too. Usually, it is better to err on the side of 
caution by creating a large perimeter, even if it is not needed in the end. Furthermore, if 
the OPD had established effective command and control, involving a call for outside 
agency assistance, more personnel would have managed the larger perimeter, thereby 
promoting communication. More importantly, if the apartment were found to be empty 
during forced entry, the move to expand the search would have already been underway. 
SWAT resources that responded would have been expanded as well, assuming that multiple 
searches for the missing suspect were needed. A regional partnership involving multiple 
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jurisdictional entities could pool those resources, including SWAT, to best respond to any 
further call associated with the incident. Last, if this regional effort had failed to produce a 
suspect within a specific period, the scaling back of this regional response could have been 
undertaken at the appropriate time.  
4. Additional Observations 
The OPD’s incident in March 2009 was both tragic and a good learning opportunity 
for future critical incidents involving SWAT teams. The need to address response 
challenges from a cultural standpoint has just as much importance as challenges from a 
technical or tactical standpoint. The commonalities in this chapter appear in Table 3. 
Table 3. Chapter IV Summary of Challenge Points 
for Large-Team SWAT Units 




1) Lack of coordination and 
communication among units 
on scene  
 
2) Unit self-assignment 
1) No evidence of SWAT 
operators on scene having 
trained together for the specific 
mission 
 
2) No evidence of dynamic 
entry training with operators 
on scene 
1) No formal ICP 
established  
 








All of the lessons learned from both case studies have a direct correlation with the 
research question posed at the beginning of this thesis: Given the scale, scope, and 
complexity of modern mass-casualty or critical incidents, how do SWAT team structures 
dealing with interoperability, training, familiarity, and command and control need to 
change for SWAT response to remain viable? The answer to this question is posed once 
again in Chapter V, with a specific emphasis on the need for a focused multijurisdictional 
response in any given region. In addition, Chapter V posits the need to include task force 
elements—already seen in established law enforcement units around the country—in 
SWAT team formation. 
61 
V. TASK FORCE SWAT CONCEPTS AS A SOLUTION 
As the previous case studies on SWAT response at critical incidents have 
demonstrated, there are several areas of focus, or challenge points, that tactical teams still 
find difficult in dealing with both during response and while on scene. Table 4 was created 
to summarize these common challenge points. 
Table 4. Thesis Summary of Main Challenge Points for SWAT Units 









1) Difficulty in scaled 
training for large group 
scenarios 
 
2) Continual and 
consistent training 
challenges on a larger 
scale 
1) Cultural and 
jurisdictional issues in 
determining command and 
control 
 









2) Unit self-assignment 
1) No evidence of SWAT 
team cross-training  
 
2) Lack of familiarity 
among the LAPD, SBSO, 
and other SWAT teams 
1) No formal ICP 









1) Lack of coordination 
and communication 
among units on scene  
 
2) Unit self-assignment 
1) No evidence of SWAT 
operators on scene having 
trained together for the 
specific mission 
 
2) No evidence of 
dynamic entry training 
with operators on scene 
1) No formal ICP 
established  
 
2) No regional or unified 
ICP established 
 
3) Lack of familiarity at 
critical incidents 
 
These challenge points are not easy to solve, and while this chapter discusses a 
potential strategic solution for many of them, it would be unrealistic to think there is a 
perfect answer. Cultural, political, and resource allocation needs are just some of the 
reasons a major shift in SWAT team foundations and protocols for a given region could be 
problematic. Moreover, the proposed solution in this chapter, a task force–based approach 
to SWAT critical incident response, will create additional coordination and logistical needs 
62 
that might make incorporating such a model too complex or economically infeasible. 
Nevertheless, an argument could be made that many of the previous challenges, as 
highlighted in Chapters III and IV, had associated lessons learned that a task force–based 
solution could conceivably solve.  
As mentioned in Chapter I, task forces have been used successfully to combat many 
types of crime in America for decades. With a foundation in military use, task force units 
have pooled resources when a specific type of response is needed to accomplish a mission 
successfully.153 In attempting to answer the research question, this thesis argues that 
SWAT team critical incident response is just another type of mission that requires a 
combined area of focus for the units involved. Crisis negotiators, entry teams, snipers, 
breaching experts, and more all come together to accomplish this mission. Task force–
based SWAT units—or SWAT teams made up of local, state, and federal SWAT operators 
and supervisors from a given region—would allow for a more streamlined response to the 
challenges faced during these critical incidents. The following sections discuss how these 
types of teams could work together more efficiently than current SWAT team structures. 
A. FUTURE BEST PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following section presents some of the benefits from a best-practices solution 
standpoint that a task force–based SWAT team would provide. The areas of benefit appear 
in italics to draw attention to them in text. 
1. Interoperability/Standardization 
The ability for units on scene at a critical incident to effectively communicate, 
seamlessly integrate with each other, and understand what tools are needed and how to 
operate them through previous familiarity cannot be overstated. This issue, as previously 
mentioned, comes more into play when large groups of responders come together to handle 
                                                 
153 Richard H. Shultz, “U.S. Counterterrorism Operations during the Iraq War: A Case Study of Task 
Force 714,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 10 (2017): 809–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.
2016.1239990; Merriam-Webster, s.v. “task force,” accessed January 13, 2020, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/task+force; “Organized Crime Task Force,” New York State Office of the Attorney 
General,” accessed January 13, 2020, https://ag.ny.gov/bureau/organized-crime-task-force; Newcomb, 
Barnes, and Elshihabi, “US Tackles Money Laundering in Anti-Terror Push.” 
63 
a large or complex critical incident. Providing loaner equipment to partner agencies or 
providing a liaison to be a communication relay is a common workaround. SWAT units 
notoriously struggle with this challenge, and when seconds matter, having to use a liaison 
between tactical teams is a recipe for disaster. While some regions see more success in 
patching radio frequencies than others, generally, the issue becomes a technical mess when 
federal or state law enforcement entities are in play. This is because it is uncommon for 
regions of law enforcement groups to use exactly the same technology to communicate or 
accomplish a mission.  
A task force–based SWAT response would be a solution to this challenge for 
several reasons. First, such a unit would regularly respond together and, by default, be 
required to carry and be familiar with the same communications equipment. As with any 
other current SWAT unit, this team would need to understand what radio codes are used 
for what purposes and what frequencies are used for specific types of calls. This would be 
the case regardless of whether the unit comprises local, state, and federal law enforcement 
operators. When this unit is deployed to a critical incident for a given mission or set of 
missions, it immediately becomes more effective in terms of communication than several 
stand-alone teams that respond and then pair up with each other. There would be little to 
no need to provide loaner equipment or logistically solve technology roadblocks to 
integrate seamlessly. This unit is designed to be in a constant state of seamless integration.  
Second, a task force SWAT unit would be a focal point for whole-scene integration. 
This means that when cross-communication issues arise from parent agencies working 
together at the same critical incident scene, this SWAT unit could act as a liaison by default. 
The following hypothetical example illustrates this concept more clearly. A large multi-
pronged attack on a piece of critical infrastructure in a given part of the United States draws 
a large contingent of law enforcement to the scene. This contingent includes federal 
partners like the FBI, state partners like the highway patrol (assuming they have a 
comparable tactical team component), and local police agencies that work in and around 
this area. Because a task force–based SWAT unit has been created and is responsible for 
the area, it responds as well. During the critical incident response, a unified command post 
is established, and communication between multiple elements of the incident begin to 
64 
occur. As the incident progresses, a local law enforcement partner cannot communicate 
effectively with a federal partner (FBI) or state partner (highway patrol) on scene when 
attempting to set up investigation protocols for scene processing. All three of these 
agencies are represented by SWAT members from this task force, who can step in, 
communicate with each other the needs of their parent agencies, and bridge the 
communication gaps. This whole-scene integration could be done both at the operator level 
or the supervisor level at the ICP, partly because seamless interoperability has already been 
preestablished.  
Third, the ability to place all of the SWAT response in a given incident on one 
frequency allows for the “decluttering” of radio traffic on other frequencies being used for 
the same critical incident. A task force contingent of SWAT units composed of multiple 
agencies would help facilitate this strategy. It is not uncommon for a complex critical 
incident scene to trigger large amounts of radio traffic that can quickly tie up channels 
needed for emergency communication. In addition, the inability to communicate quickly 
and effectively can lead to blue-on-blue situations such as the one the LAPD’s and SBSO’s 
SWAT units experienced during the Dorner incident.154 Instead of having all of these 
SWAT units individually responding and attempting to communicate on multiple or 
patched frequencies that conflict with other elements of the response, this task force unit 
would instead be completely separate from all other on-scene critical incident units in 
terms of interoperable communication. At the same time, this team would still have a 
commander or multiple commanders at the ICP, who would allow for a unified command 
and effective top-down communication during the response. As a result, other responding 
resources, including patrol, EMS, and public works, would not have to compete with 
SWAT for dedicated radio channel use.  
2. Training and Familiarity 
Both this section and the section on command and control are arguably the most 
significant areas in which a task force–based solution to SWAT team structure would be 
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beneficial. Undoubtedly, there were large gaps in training and familiarity in both the 
Dorner and OPD incidents. In the case of Dorner, some of these gaps were understandable; 
multiple agencies were responding to an unknown area to assist with a chaotic series of 
scenes. The SWAT response itself was a collaboration of several agencies attempting to 
intervene without a specific request to do so.155 This caused overlap and blue-on-blue 
situations that could have been avoided, partially due to unfamiliarity and lack of 
coordinated training for such an incident. Deferment to a multijurisdictional SWAT unit 
that included partners from all of these agencies would have likely been more successful 
in managing these challenges. 
The OPD case is even more apparent in its lack of prepared response, especially 
from an internal standpoint. SWAT units essentially rushed into an unknown environment 
they had little training to handle while working with partner operators they were unfamiliar 
with.156 The reasons this happened have been covered by the incident AAR and earlier 
portions of this thesis, but suffice it to say, a coordinated response involving a task force 
SWAT team not emotionally connected to the incident yet with an extensive background 
in entry, negotiations, and scene management would have been preferred.  
The need to train regularly and be familiar with each operator’s capabilities on a 
team has been mentioned several times due to its extreme importance; in addition, any 
response requiring that multiple agencies’ units handle rapidly unfolding, complex 
scenarios demands that SWAT has rehearsed the scenario to the point of “muscle 
memory.”157 This can be better accomplished by narrowing the response to a core group 
specially trained and familiar with such a scenario. While one could argue that both the 
Dorner case (the SBSO’s SWAT) and the Oakland case (the OPD’s SWAT) had the group 
for the mission, there were still too many breakdowns for multiple reasons. A task force 
SWAT unit, composed of members from every regional team in a given area that are 
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required to train together and be familiar with each other’s capabilities, would improve 
efficiency at critical incidents. There are examples of regional teams similar to the 
prescribed task force–based structure in this chapter that have seen good results; one such 
example is the Metro-LEC unit on the East Coast.158 While not a task force–based unit, it 
is similar in that it draws from multiple agencies in a given region to form a conglomerate 
team able to respond to calls in the region that the individual departments composing the 
team and region could not handle alone.  
In both the Dorner and OPD cases, a SWAT task force made up of local, state, and 
federal entities in each region would have been called out to the scene with the 
understanding that the jurisdictional agency would be tasked with “freezing” or “holding” 
the scene until the task force SWAT team arrived. As the unit would include several SBSO 
SWAT personnel in the Dorner case and several OPD SWAT personnel in the Oakland 
case, this coordination would have been be straightforward from a communication 
standpoint. The task force SWAT unit would have a large contingent of personnel to call 
upon that would have the background training and familiarity with each other to respond 
and set up at a scene seamlessly; this type of training need would have already been 
covered in the required training sessions each member of the task force SWAT team 
attended. Of course, if ether call transitioned into an active shooter scenario before SWAT 
arrived—the Dorner case was arguably a borderline situation while the SBSO’s SWAT 
was responding and while they were on scene—first-responder active-shooter protocols to 
deal with the threat would still be in effect. Once the scene transitioned to SWAT control, 
the task force unit would handle all action going forward.  
With a regular training schedule for dynamic entry, the multiple types of breaching 
needed, crisis negotiations, and command and control, among other elements, this task 
force–based team would allow for all its partner agencies to work through confusion about 
tactics while agreeing on protocols for deployment. This would have to be done prior to 
any group being put in service; in fact, an agreement to form such a group would be trailed 
by months of familiarity and training sessions to get everyone on the same page. This would 
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not be an easy task and would require concessions from nearly every agency participant. 
While many of the tactics seen from a SWAT perspective nationally are similar, there are 
subtle differences due to a department’s or team’s culture that emerge either consciously 
or unconsciously. Things like team leadership and decision making, regionalization of 
services, legitimacy recognition, and trust would of course need to be tackled.159 Again, 
these reasons and more necessitate months of preparation prior to initial deployment for 
team success. To be fair, these kinds of issues, particularly coordination and logistical 
challenges, are why many cities or regions would balk at this type of team. Regardless, 
once these challenges are met head-on, the resulting long-term benefits will be apparent in 
future responses.  
When it comes to training, however, the advantages to this type of structure are 
obvious. Because this unit would comprise regional partner agencies, they would have 
direct access to multiple training venues and resources that any single agency in the region 
would not. Local, state, and federal training facilities would be a force multiplier for the 
task force–based group, as would access to all of the participating agencies’ training 
curriculum and instructor cadres. Regional subject-matter experts in just about every field 
of SWAT response to critical incidents would either be available or potentially even part 
of the unit. Without question, this would be one of the most significant benefits of creating 
such a unit.  
3. Command and Control 
The ability of decisionmakers at a large chaotic critical scene to streamline response 
for arguably the most technical portions of the incident—SWAT movements and timings—
is extremely valuable. As previously discussed, this is difficult at best when multiple 
elements of the call cloud the ability for on-scene leadership to make logical decisions. 
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Emotions, self-dispatching of units, and multiple agencies’ attempting to intervene are just 
some of the elements that can tax leadership’s scene management abilities.  
A task force SWAT response during critical incidents would help to relieve some 
of this burden, as it would allow for several vital benefits based solely on its structure. First, 
because it is composed of regional partners and supervisors from local, state, and federal 
jurisdictional levels, the task force SWAT team responding will be more efficient in its 
ability to be managed by the incident commander. The reason is that any incident 
commander could communicate with the on-scene SWAT commander in the ICP, and that 
SWAT commander would have direct contact with multiple regional agency 
representatives that compose his or her team. 
The Dorner and OPD cases illustrate the inherent value of having this contact with 
regional SWAT team involvement at an incident. In the Dorner case, it would have 
prevented blue-on-blue incidents from occurring.160 In the OPD case, it would have gone 
a long way to avoid the emotionality of decision making that arguably affected how 
leadership on scene viewed the events as they occurred. In both cases, the result of the 
incident was a deceased suspect (one by likely suicide, one by gunfire from police). This 
result is one that, regardless of any justifiable reasons, will likely result in lawsuits from 
surviving kin.161 In comparing both of the cases studied in this thesis, a task force–based 
SWAT unit would stand a much better chance of justifiably avoiding any bias claims that 
can come with a lawsuit when an agency kills a person after that person has killed one of 
the agency’s officers.  
To be fair, it would not eliminate this possibility completely; it is always possible 
that a member of the task force SWAT unit kills a suspect after that suspect has caused 
harm or has killed a member of that officer’s parent agency. Thus, a “bias or emotionally 
based decision” argument could be made in that instance. Regardless, the chances of such 
a claim are much lower when the task force SWAT unit is composed of multiple regional 
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agencies rather than one agency from a given jurisdiction. Most importantly, leadership at 
a critical incident like the cases studied would have the added level of confidence that task 
force–based SWAT operators could better complete the mission at hand due to a likely 
reduced personal connection to the suspect or incident.  
Second, a task force–based SWAT unit brings with it enhanced direct access to 
incident-related resources due to its structure in comparison to a regional mutual-aid or 
composite response, which would also bring indirect access to those resources. In other 
words, each member of the task force SWAT team would have the ability to tap its parent 
agency’s resources directly without having to reach out to an outside regional partner first. 
Access to resources quickly is extremely important for apparent reasons.162 This direct 
access streamlines the resource directly to where it is needed: the incident or SWAT 
commander on scene. Conversely, regardless of how good a relationship regional partners 
share or how large a single stand-alone SWAT unit is, any request for resources from a 
partner agency comes with it the built-in bureaucracy of the request and approval process. 
While this may be quicker in extreme situations like a critical incident, there would still be 
a delay compared to any direct agency resource. Figure 5 compares such resource access 
models. For the large agency model, the example is that of a standalone local police SWAT 
unit, such as the OPD’s SWAT team discussed in Chapter IV. 
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Figure 5. Direct versus Indirect Resource Access Models for Large-Team, 
Mutual-Aid, and Task-Force SWAT Units 
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As these basic models demonstrate, the task force–based SWAT structure provides 
more direct resource access for any participant unit compared to that of a mutual-aid or 
large-team structure. The task force–based unit would need to be structured in a way to 
maximize these resources at any given critical incident so that the need to augment 
resources with outside allocation is minimal. Given that no critical incident happens in a 
vacuum, there is no way to cancel out a potential need for additional non-direct resources 
completely. This is especially true the longer an incident lasts, as personnel, equipment, 
and other incident-related resources will need to be replenished. Still, a critical incident 
from a SWAT perspective would be easier to manage both in the short and long term when 
the resource requests and procurement come from within.  
B. POLICY AND PROCEDURAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following focus areas are given as a baseline for any region considering the 
implementation of a task force–based SWAT team and built on the case studies discussed 
in this thesis, the author’s training and experience, and other relevant literature. They are 
not all-inclusive but starting points when planning strategic implementation of a formal 
memorandum of understanding (MOU), policies, and mutual-aid agreements. Many of the 
listed recommendations closely resemble protocols in place for composite units throughout 
the United States while others are unique to the recommended solution for SWAT team 
critical incident response. The recommendations are listed in order of perceived 
significance to the successful formation of a multijurisdictional tactical unit: 
1. Establish formal agreements or MOUs for a regionalized task force–based 
SWAT team structure among all regional partners. 
For a regionalized team to function correctly from a legal standpoint, all 
participating agencies that desire to be part of this task force should sign a formal 
agreement via agency leadership. This agreement is sometimes referred to as a 
memorandum of understanding.163 It is recommended that regional task force SWAT 
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participants formally establish an MOU. This recommendation is based on previous real-
world examples of successful multiagency participation, some of which appear in 
Appendices A and B. The MOU should include language that covers every participating 
agency’s authority to participate in the task force, task force responsibilities for every 
agency, cost recovery, and other important procedures related to the unit’s procedures.  
One of the key elements to successful law enforcement task force implementation 
is federal involvement from a participating agency standpoint.164 There are multiple 
examples of federal law enforcement agencies joining with local and state law enforcement 
to further a joint criminal investigation or mission. Whether that federal agency is 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement for a border security mission, the U.S. Treasury 
Department for an ongoing currency fraud concern in a region, or the FBI in a domestic 
anti-terrorism partnership with local and state police, the common denominator is apparent. 
Federal involvement is key in resource and authority extension for any task force, as has 
been shown by the increase in the last several decades of federal task forces created to 
combat crime normally classified a local police issue.165 Federal buy-in to the formation 
of a task force–structured SWAT team will also allow for continual funding, training, and 
personnel issues to be better planned for from a strategic management position for all local 
partners involved.  
2. Establish a cost-sharing structure for all participating agencies in a SWAT 
team. 
With the creation and implementation of this type of team, there should be a 
reasonable expectation of increased budgetary and resource costs for all agencies involved. 
Additional personnel hours devoted to training and missions, equipment, and logistical 
costs for keeping the team operational, as well as other associated expenses, are line items 
that no one participating agency should be expected to cover. It is recommended that a 
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cost-sharing schedule of expenses and budgetary items be created with each agency taking 
a percentage share based on its level of participation. This recommendation is based on 
past practices of successful joint ventures between many governmental organizations.166 
Ideally, this cost-sharing should be spread out equally among all participating agencies so 
that everyone shares the added expense of maintaining this asset.  
3. Formalize protocols for a chain of command.  
Establishing a unit that involves multiple agency personnel is difficult from a chain-
of-command standpoint. Law enforcement personnel working on the task force, whether 
full or part time, will naturally need to understand whom they report to and what 
supervisors are responsible for the unit. It is recommended that a regionalized and formal 
approach to the chain of command for the task force SWAT team be utilized. This 
recommendation is based on both real-world examples and the case studies mentioned 
earlier. The Metro-LEC organizational chart in Figure 6 depicts how this chain of 
command might be structured.167 Specifically, the far-left side of the chart (Special Tactics 
and Response Division) illustrates the chain of command from a SWAT structure 
perspective. 
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Figure 6. A Chain-of-Command or Organizational Chart for Metro-LEC168 
For optimal collaboration and cooperation, each participating agency should have 
a supervising member in this chain of command, with regular rotating assignments at each 
level. This would allow for both shared supervisor experience and trust to be built over 
time. If any single participating agency takes control of the team permanently, the 
likelihood of long-term trust would erode, as would the ability for the unit to be flexible in 
the event of a loss of any individual supervisor. Federal, state, and local supervisory 
representatives should rotate through assignments; as this unit would still be governed by 
its parent agency, any decision-making confusion or conflict of interest could still be 
regulated by department heads. Again, the key is the need for regional buy-in and 
agreement. Without it, the expected challenges that will arise within the unit from time to 
time will be difficult to overcome. This recommendation is based on best practices from 
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current multiagency collaborations, including the Metro-LEC model, that follow these 
practices. 
The length of supervisor participation would be spelled out in the MOU as part of 
the participant agreements. In addition, this chain of command should include a group of 
recognized department head or designee decisionmakers from an executive level—again, 
modeling the Metro-LEC model. This group would be tasked with the continual 
maintenance of the SWAT task force from a strategic level. Ongoing concerns such as unit 
makeup, training, relevant legal changes, budget, and other current challenges would be 
constantly addressed by this group.  
4. Establish formal protocols for response triggers and resource allocation. 
Within any SWAT team’s policies and procedures is usually a list of mission sets 
that generally define when the team will respond. The need for a task force–based SWAT 
team should not be unilaterally applied to any SWAT-related mission that other tactical 
units might handle. This is because the potential for overuse or misuse could increase; for 
example, having a multijurisdictional team with federal personnel attached to it execute a 
lower-level search warrant might be construed and “overkill.”169 It is recommended that 
formal, structured protocols be established in writing for response triggers for this task 
force–based SWAT team. This thesis has imagined the use of such a team for critical 
incidents involving multiple agencies and the need for a SWAT response, based on the case 
studies presented and current SWAT challenges, both of which were discussed in previous 
chapters. Thus, the triggers would be directly related to significantly dangerous incidents 
involving multiple agencies and resources, including SWAT. This thesis did not look at 
many of the other relevant SWAT team missions and how a task force–based approach 
might be applied. 
However, some might argue that the use of a team like this only during a critical 
incident scenario is too myopic when weighing the cost and benefits of creating and 
maintaining this type of unit. Additionally, the very definition of a critical incident differs 
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depending on who is defining the term.170 Thus, the need to narrowly define when this 
unit should respond and under which mission set it would assist is very important to prevent 
abuse by those with too broad or narrow a definition. One of the main challenges for any 
leadership group considering a task force–based SWAT unit, among other things, would 
be to succinctly capture this definition in the MOU or policy so that it does not leave the 
response triggers open to interpretation.  
5. Establish selection, training standards, use-of-force, and equipment 
protocols for all participating agencies. 
One of the foundational elements of a task force–based unit is personnel with 
variety in training and experience in their law enforcement careers.171 This can be a big 
benefit to the unit; different experiences and perspectives shed light on unique problems 
faced by the group as a whole. However, it can be a cause of confusion as well, and the 
leadership of this task force–based unit would need to anticipate and plan for this likely 
challenge. It is recommended that the regional SWAT task force unit’s leadership group 
establish standardized selection, training, and equipment protocols. This recommendation 
is based on both real-world examples, such as the Metro-LEC approach, and other 
literature.172 Doing so would likely allow for a more streamlined response and tactics 
during any critical incident mission the unit undertakes.  
Selection and time in the unit would need to be structured and fair for every 
participating agency.173 The size of the unit should be based on regional needs, and larger 
agencies would likely provide more personnel than smaller agencies. Regardless, a formal 
rotational schedule and selection process would need to be finalized so that standards are 
maintained whenever a member leaves the unit, and all regional partners should have direct 
access to the unit.  
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As each agency participant will likely have differences in protocols for things such 
as use-of-force response, team movement and tactics, communication, and other related 
SWAT concerns, the need to standardize is paramount.174 While this need might appear 
to be a monumental challenge, it is common for many regional law enforcement 
communities to have similar policies and practices. Thus, any standardization of training 
and equipment would likely not be a significant change for the individual agencies and 
personnel involved.  
There would likely be a need for the procurement of additional equipment and 
training to accomplish this task. While the participants will come from a similar 
foundational point in these fields, there will still be differences. This factor is especially 
true when pairing federal agencies with local and state agencies. Federal agencies will of 
course have standardized equipment that matches their national partners around the country 
instead of just the local agencies they work with. For example, the need for the FBI to 
communicate and operate with other federal agencies like Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement or the U.S. Border Patrol requires communications equipment that has 
different specifications than those of two local agencies that need to communicate.175 
Thus, it is likely the local and state agencies on the SWAT task force will need to acquiesce 
to their federal partners on the unit for equipment.  
Training standardization will be a challenge as well. Tactics, governing law, and 
procedures that have been learned over many years will need to be adjusted to a system 
that allows for a consistent, predictable response from every participant. This, in turn, 
fosters trust among the multiple agencies at a scene, which is also crucial. One option when 
determining proper use-of-force protocols is to defer to the parent agency’s policies. In 
other words, the MOU and any adjoining policy could explicitly state that a task force 
participant, when using any level of force, defers to one’s originating agency for proper 
guidance. While this has the benefit of easing understanding, it could cause confusion when 
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force is applied unevenly by multiple members of the team during an incident. Ultimately, 
regional leadership will need to decide how to navigate this challenge best so that the task 
force–based unit has no doubt about what is allowable and what is banned when making 
use-of-force decisions in the field.  
6. Establish an AAR process for independent check and balance of unit. 
It should be expected that the creation of a multijurisdictional SWAT team will 
invoke concerns from the public. Concerns over the militarization of police, the overuse of 
SWAT teams, and the higher likelihood of this unit being involved in shooting deaths are 
all likely to be brought to the forefront by the region’s citizenry. It is recommended that an 
independent review board be created with the mission to review any deployment of this 
unit for corrective actions or concerns. This recommendation is based on literature 
discussing the success in fostering trust from the community when it has a voice in the 
process.176 This board would have the authority to weigh in on future policies and 
procedures as a result of incident reviews that it carries out. It should also complete a cost–
benefit analysis annually of the unit as it pertains to future budgetary considerations. This 
analysis should be a tool among many considerations when a region is considering the 
continual viability of a task force–based SWAT unit.  
One of the crucial elements of this board would be its demographic makeup. It 
should involve the citizens of the region to some extent so that the public has a voice as 
well as a method to better guarantee transparency. For several reasons, it should not, 
however, be composed entirely of members of the public. For one, many of the tactics, and 
decision making used, of such a highly specialized unit like this task force–based SWAT 
team would be foreign to most members of the public and, thus, potentially misunderstood. 
Second, expenses incurred by a unit like this would be difficult to understand and therefore 
hard to justify without proper context. Subject-matter experts who have worked in the same 
law enforcement field should also be considered for this type of review board. Other 
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members of government, such as those in the legal, public works, or financial fields, would 
also be good candidates. Last, as the task force unit comprises participants from all three 
levels of government, review board members with familiarity in one or all of these levels 
would also be highly desirable.  
7. Draft memoranda of understanding.  
MOUs used as references for this thesis appear in the Appendix. They cover 
structure, funding, and other related agreements between local, state, and federal partners 
for a combined mission. They are listed as references specifically for the purposes of 
showing interagency cooperation at a multijurisdictional level. 
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VI. THE FUTURE OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL SWAT TEAMS 
The need for future SWAT units to be agile in critical incident response is obvious. 
Future challenges that SWAT teams will face are hard to predict but will undoubtedly force 
law enforcement as a whole to adapt its tactical teams on both a small and large scale at 
various times. As the Greek philosopher Heraclitus believed, life is in a constant state of 
flux, and it is no different in police work.177 Moreover, this is an easy statement to make 
based on the history of SWAT; from the 1960s until the present day, demands on these 
teams from multiple perspectives have forced, and will continue to force, SWAT units to 
morph.  
With constant change being a future reality that SWAT units and their parent 
agencies can count on, it behooves law enforcement to proactively seek ways to prepare 
for every eventuality. That requires future SWAT units to transition resources, missions, 
and jurisdictional focus at a moment’s notice. A SWAT team composed of local, state, and 
federal personnel would have the ability to do so if the regional agencies needing such 
support are in agreement. Cultural, political, and economic biases in a given region are to 
be expected, faced head-on, and met to everyone’s satisfaction for total unit success. 
Previous agreements discussed in this thesis show that cooperation for successful 
implementation has happened in the past and can occur again in creating this type of 
regional team.  
As many law enforcement agencies currently look to streamline budgets due to 
societal shifts toward police accountability, it could be argued that the move to this type of 
structure for regional SWAT response would save money in the long run. Critical incidents 
cause a great demand on resources from responding agencies, so having the prescribed task 
force SWAT team to carry the burden of training and internal or direct resources could 
dramatically cut down on redundancy or waste. This would be an important factor in 
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studying the long-term benefits of such a unit, which is discussed further in the following 
section. 
It is important to briefly discuss implementation strategies, counterarguments to 
creating a task force–based SWAT unit, and the limitations of this thesis. This discussion 
is important from a transparency standpoint and provides additional context to the realities 
of undertaking such a major shift in strategic planning. While it would be easy to tout only 
the benefits of this prescriptive change, the importance of all likely stakeholders being fully 
informed requires further discussion on the potential short- and long-term challenges this 
process would create. 
A. IMPLEMENTATION, COUNTERARGUMENTS, AND LIMITATIONS 
When discussing implementation specifically, the need for a subject-matter expert, 
or a group of experts, to be an advocate for this process is a starting point. Department 
leadership would of course make the final decision on approvals for the process to move 
forward. Any major change to a system or function in law enforcement, however, arguably 
starts with a person or group of people who have a passion for this change and can visualize 
its eventual creation. Without this advocate element, the possibility of strategic leaders’ 
understanding the benefits of a task force-based regional SWAT unit and comprehending 
the framework in which it would be created, is low.  
Once this subject-matter expert or group of experts can meet with the regional 
leadership and convince them of this structure’s viability, continual involvement in the 
process by this person or group would need to continue. The formal creation of an MOU, 
creation of an organizational chart, funding and budgetary concerns, and many other 
relevant topics would need their continual attention throughout the implementation 
process. Included in this process is the understanding that due to various factors in 
governmental organizations, projects sometimes stall or pause for a time. As of this writing, 
the COVID-19 virus is challenging workflow and budgetary strategies for many law 
enforcement agencies around the country. In addition, there is a current cultural shift in 
law enforcement response to civil unrest in America as a result of several recent police use-
of-force incidents. The death of George Floyd and other minorities in different parts of the 
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United States from the actions of law enforcement personnel have inflamed the already 
sensitive issue of community and police relations.  
These types of challenges are just a few of the examples that might create 
roadblocks for a structural change in SWAT processes. The designated advocates for this 
change must be able to both anticipate and plan for their likely occurrence.  
It should also be noted that there would likely be counterarguments to such a 
structural change to SWAT teams. The fact that any additional training, equipment, and 
personnel would only increase the cost of maintaining a SWAT team in a given region 
might be one argument. Additionally, some may argue that this change is only replicating 
what already exists. In other words, if a region is pulling personnel from already created 
SWAT units, why not just leave the personnel in place, and change the region’s training 
guidelines for critical incident response? Last, the public could push back and state that the 
need for a unit like the one proposed in Chapter V trails other structural changes currently 
demanded by many communities of their police around the country.  
In addition to other claims, these could all be arguments made for the prevention of 
any move to a task force–based unit as a supplemental entity in a given region. They 
deserve consideration and are valid concerns to be weighed by decisionmakers in any 
analysis of the recommended changes. Some of these concerns are why this thesis 
prescribed the creation of a review board in the previous chapter; the continual feedback 
of all involved stakeholders should be an integral part of the process. Ultimately, the 
homeland security leadership group tasked with such decisions must be willing to consider 
these counterarguments while weighing the overall value of a task force–based regional 
team.  
Moreover, the limitations of this thesis will undoubtedly leave unanswered 
questions for the homeland security leader considering the adoption of the 
recommendations discussed. This thesis covered SWAT response from a critical incident 
perspective while discussing specific challenges in training and familiarity, 
interoperability, and command and control. This thesis did not consider the many other 
critical incident response elements that directly affect SWAT team efficiency. One of the 
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vital undiscussed elements of critical incident handling is fire and law enforcement 
integration, which has become an emergent response model in the form of rescue task 
forces. This model is very beneficial in the first-responder realm of active shooters, and 
while there are tactical emergency medical technicians trained to respond with SWAT 
during operations, discussing them in addition to the other technical portions of this thesis 
would have been too time-consuming.  
Another area this thesis did not explore was the legal ramifications of merging 
federal, state, and local SWAT teams. It is an important aspect of the creation of such a 
unit and could potentially be a thesis topic all on its own. While this thesis discussed the 
importance of formal MOU creation and structure, undoubtedly the need for legal 
frameworks, governing laws that would allow for unit creation and sustainment, and 
powers of arrest would require more time and depth than this thesis could provide.  
Finally, the world of SWAT cultural interaction is not as well documented from a 
scholarly perspective as other law enforcement elements. Studying how SWAT teams 
interact internally and externally, and how that interaction ultimately affects decision 
making and tactics, is worthy of future research. This thesis, however, was not the 
appropriate vehicle for such a study. As a result, the author’s training and experiences were 
interlaced with related scholarly sources to provide this context for attempting to answer 
the posed research question. To be fair, this background and experience are not all-
encompassing and must be acknowledged so that the reader may have a complete picture 
of this thesis topic. Given all these things, additional areas regarding SWAT team response 
were not covered in this thesis.  
B. GAPS AND FURTHER RESEARCH NEEDS 
Whether a team such as the one proposed as a critical incident SWAT solution 
would be a viable solution for other types of SWAT missions is unknown. SWAT units are 
generally tasked with high-risk warrants, barricaded suspects, and other local calls for 
service that exceed the normal patrol capabilities of a given police agency. Compared to 
critical incidents, where many of the political and cultural opinions on SWAT are 
suspended due to the severity of the threat, lower-level missions that municipal SWAT 
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teams regularly handle are already the subject of societal scrutiny.178 Using a team with a 
task force structure that includes federal and state law enforcement personnel would need 
further research to determine suitability. 
Additionally, a long-term risk versus reward study to determine the sustainability 
and worthiness of a task force SWAT team needs examination. The Metro-LEC approach 
referenced in this thesis could be a program that sheds light on this research question, as 
well as other similar task force–based units. Any agreements that would provide asset-
forfeiture sharing for this type of SWAT team would undoubtedly play a part in that 
determination. Ultimately, the research needed to answer this question would likely come 
after the formal establishment and extended in-service time of such a unit.  
Another area of future exploration is the use of task forces as a resource solution at 
critical incidents outside the SWAT realm. Those who advocate a whole-of-government 
approach might see the value in adapting large-scale response in a region to one that mirrors 
a task force structure.179 Fire, EMS, shelter services, and other common critical incident 
or disaster scene elements may benefit from a pooling of resources. The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency is an entity that comes to mind as one that might support 
this model, as it could support more regional involvement in disaster preparation.180 This 
concept, similar to mutual aid, would require some of the same research efforts if not more 
than those undertaken for this thesis.  
Finally, research into whether a unit like this would be accepted from a societal 
standpoint is a question that needs answering. As previously mentioned, SWAT teams in 
general have not always been viewed from a positive perspective. This reality is due to 
multiple incidents wherein critical errors have occurred, the current relationship challenges 
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between police and the community, and the belief by some in society that SWAT teams 
are too militaristic and overstep the police mission in a given community.181  
Going forward, how society views a larger conglomerate of local, state, and federal 
law enforcement personnel in a SWAT capacity is an important question needing answers. 
The basis of this thesis was not sociological in nature, and the topic of SWAT interaction 
from a social acceptance perspective would require extensive research in and of itself. 
Regardless, the question is an important one to answer and is worthy of further research.  
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APPENDIX A. SAMPLE LAW ENFORCEMENT FISCAL 
AGREEMENT  
The document in Appendix A is an agreement between the New York City Police 
Department and state and federal agencies.182 
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APPENDIX B. SAMPLE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING  
The document in Appendix B is a memorandum of understanding between the New 
York City Police Department and Homeland Security Investigations.183 
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